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ABSTRACT
Today there is a burgeoning "new" law and economics 
literature which extends the application of economic prin­
ciples virtually across the board.
The essence of the "new" law and economics is value 
(or wealth) maximization, which means exploiting economic 
resources in such a way that value — human satisfaction 
as measured by willingness and ability to pay— is maximized . 
Value maximization has become essential in both explanative 
and reformative analyses of the law.
This new science of law is not without its critics.
They include economists, especially those of the Austrian 
and American Institutionalist schools, as well as various 
legal theorists and practitioners not professionally 
trained in economics.
In the wake of their criticisms, this essay attempts 
to get at the heart of the question of what economic 
theory can, in general, contribute to the making and 
administering of the law. The principle thesis is that 
while economics can be enormously useful in matters of 
instrumental rationality— matters of procedure, of the 
means to achieve given ends, it does not suffice in matters 
of substantive rationality, viz, in a discussion of ends.
Thus economics cannot adequately support a complete theory 
of law, for one ultimately must look beyond economics
i i i
for the ends the law is designed to achieve.
In order to establish positively what economics can 
contribute to legal theory, it is necessary first to discuss 
the nature and scope of economic science in general. This 
dissertation develops the position that "economic efficiency" 
is of dubious scientific value (since it rests ultimately on 
invalid utility comparisons) and that the significance of economic 
science derives essentially from its analysis of choice behavior.
Upon this conception of economic science an alternative, 
"prudential" law and economics is proposed. This type of 
analysis is shown to be relevant to virtually all categories 
of the law, but concerns only instrumental considerations. It 
calls for a broad application of economic principles, yet is 
subservient to political and moral wisdom. Instead of claiming 
to avoid substantive rationality, it urges a return to serious 
moral discourse.
I. INTRODUCTION
The application of economic principles to law is hardly 
new. While the "traditional" law and economics literature 
is voluminous, it addresses a rather limited set of laws 
governing such things as public utilities regulation, anti­
trust and taxation. Today there is a burgeoning "new" law 
and economics literature which extends the application of 
economic principles virtually across the board. Common law 
fields such as tort, contract and property, as well as 
theories of law enforcement, punishment, judicial administra­
tion and legislation are being made a part of the "protective 
belt" of the law and economics "research effort," to use 
the terminology of philosopher Imre Lakatos. Richard Posner, 
professor law at the University of Chicago and probably 
the most important leader of the "new" law and economics 
research effort today, boasts that "whereas the 'old' law 
and economics confined its attention to laws governing 
explicitly economic relationships . . . the 'new' law and
economics recognizes no such limitation on the domain of 
economic analysis of law."'*’
The "new" law and economics was born in the early 1960's
with the publication of Guido Calabresi's seminal article 
2on torts , and Ronald Coase's equally perceptive essay
3on social costs. In the latter 1960's and 1970's Gary 
Becker demonstrated the relevance of economic principles 
to a surprising range of "nonmarket" behavior, including 
crime, marriage and racial discrimination, opening up large 
areas of legal theory to economic analysis. The early 
insights of Calabresi, Coase and Becker have been formalized, 
tested, refined and extended, yielding a general economic 
analysis of law that is supposed to have "broad explanative 
and reformative power.
The essence of the "new" law and economics today is 
value (or wealth) maximization, which means, in Posner's 
words, "exploiting economic resources in such a way that 
'value'--human satisfaction as measured by willingness and 
ability to pay--is maximized. Value maximization is 
essential in both "explanative" and "reformative" analyses 
of the law. Posner and others argue that value maximization 
is already deeply ingrained in American jurisprudence, and 
that the law and legal institutions ought to be reformed 
so as to promote value maximization in those instances where 
currently they do not.
This new science of law is not without its critics.
They include economists, especially those of the Austrian 
and American Institutionalist schools, as well as various 
legal theorists and practitioners not professionally trained 
in economics.
The Austrian school has most thoroughly and consistently 
developed the implications of subjectism for law and economics.
In their interpretation, all forms of "cost" and "benefit" 
are ultimately a matter of subjective perception. Thus 
human satisfaction cannot be objectively measured since subject­
ive mental processes cannot be directly observed. If the 
economy were in full, general equilibrium, market prices 
would accurately represent subjective perceptions, but full 
equilibrium never in fact obtains. Therefore, the court 
or legislature cannot, in the Austrians' view, distinguish 
a truly efficient legal arrangement from an inefficient one, 
not even for purely descriptive purposes. And to assume 
that they can do so for reformative purposes could possibly 
have far-reaching, unintended and undesirable consequences.
The criticisms of value maximization as a normative 
percept have been developed along somewhat different lines 
by the American Institutionalists. They point out that 
value maximization per se is a tautology with regard to 
the objective function by which miaximization is reckoned:
What is efficient, or value-maximizing, by one calculation 
is inefficient when the objective function is changed, or 
when the opportunities available to the individual are legally 
or otherwise altered. Thus, value maximization based on 
willingness and ability to pay is an inadequate normative 
principle in their view, for it requires some antecedent 
premise as to the rights that determine willingness and 
ability to pay. Value maximization, they argue, is a function 
of rights, not the other way around. The crucial decision,
which ultimately the law must make, is that of the rights 
themselves.
While a number of legal theorists have attacked the 
"new" law and economics on much the same kind of instrumen­
talist grounds, an important distinction between the 
Institutionalists and the legal theorists in general is 
that many of the latter are explicitly concerned with moral 
and ethical issues. While the Institutionalists reject 
value maximization as methodologically myopic, the legal 
theorists object on the ground that it fails to serve consistenly, 
and may even contravene certain cherished ethical principles.
Those who embrace egalitarianism, for instance, object that 
value maximization might perpetuate inequality in the distri­
bution of wealth; Kantians maintain that interdiction of 
certain human rights is implied, and so on.
What is needed in the wake of these criticisms is a 
serious reevaluation of the nature and significance of the 
economic analysis of law. This essay, is an attempt to get 
at the heart of the question of what economic theory can, 
in general, contribute to the making and administering of 
the law. The principal thesis is that while economics can 
be enormously useful in matters of instrumental rationality—  
matters of procedure, of the means to achieve given ends, 
it does not suffice in matters of substantive rationality, 
viz, in a discussion of ends. Thus economic principles, 
including value maximization, will not adequately support 
a complete theory of law, for one ultimately must look
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beyond economics for the ends the law is designed to achieve. 
Economic analysis would be properly relegated to a handmaiden 
role in any reasonable system of jurisprudence.
In the American system of jurisprudence (for the most
part an eminently reasonable one) the discussion of ends
is very often a discussion of what constitutes harm and injury.
American jurisprudence is patterned to some extent after
the form delineated by Adam Smith in his Theory of Moral
Sentiments:
The wisdom of every state or Commonwealth, 
endeavors, as well as it can, to employ 
the force of the society to restrain those 
who are subject to its authority, from 
hurting or disturbing the happiness of one 
another. The rules which it establishes for 
this purpose, constitute the civil and 
criminaj law of each particular state or 
county.
To restrain one from "hurting or disturbing the happiness" 
of others —  to avoid harm and injury —  is essentially a 
negative formulation of Pareto optimality and related wealth 
maximization criteria of modern welfare economics. The 
relevance of economic analysis to this aspect of the law 
appears obvious. Therefore it is this aspect which the present 
dissertation will consider, for the most part. A semantical 
note might avoid confusion: The terms "harm and injury"
are used here, and throughout the disseration, in the most 
general sense, to refer to that which adversely affects the 
attainment of value . Any change or action which allows 
for a net increase in "value" is understood to involve 
less "harm and injury". Therefore, the discussion
6
has not abandoned value maximization for a more restricted 
negative concept. As stated above, avoiding harm and injury 
can be understood as the reciprocal formulation of value 
maximization. There is, however, one reason for emphasizing 
the cost side of the coin, namely the fact that much of 
the law and economics literature is cost oriented: reducing
net social cost is the stated objective of many analyses, 
as will be seen below. One might argue, of course, that 
treating an issue in the context of avoiding harm and injury 
brings a libertarian bias to the analysis. Such an objection 
is not unfounded, and it can be fairly said that most of 
the "new" law and economics is conducted in the spirit of 
Chicago school laissez-faire.
It must be recognized that when the purpose of the 
law is to minimize harm and injury, then a sine qua non for 
enacting rules to that purpose would be some sort of consensus 
to determine what constitutes harm and injury. Only after 
that consensus is established can the discussion move on 
to matters of procedure, of formulating particular laws 
and regulations. And, to repeat the central thesis of this 
dissertation, only at this point can the instrumental rationality 
of economics become important.
Posner and others who fully subscribe to the "new" 
law and economics would reject this thesis, for they argue, 
in general, that the kind of rationality that would take 
one beyond the realm of economic science is unnecessary for 
a complete system of law. Posner, for example, has concluded
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that:
(T)he wealth-maximization principle implies, 
first, an initial distribution of individual 
rights (to life, liberty, and labor) to 
their natural owners; second, free markets 
to enable those rights to be reassigned from 
time to time to other uses; third, legal rules 
that simulate operations of the market when the 
costs of market transaction are prohibitive; 
fourth, a system of legal remedies for deterring 
and redressing invasions of rights, and fifth,
a system of personal morality . . . Were the
traditional common law fields to be reorganized
along more functional lines, the first of these 
areas would be the domain of property law, the 
second of contract law, the third of tort law, 
and the fourth of procedural and remedial 
(including criminal) law.
In Posner's view, economic analysis is assigned much 
more than a handmaiden role: the most fundamental moral
and ethical principles are supposed to be grounded in economics. 
Whether Coase, Calabresi and Becker fully agree with Posner 
is debatable; to be sure, they have not employed precisely
the same methodology as Posner. Chapter II will examine
their approaches and argue, in part, that those before Posner 
perceived a more instrumentalist role for economics, though 
they were sometimes less than clear about this.
Chapter II will discuss two additional points regarding 
the theoretical completeness of the economic analysis of 
law, particularly value maximization as measured by willingness 
and ability to pay. While these points are secondary to 
the central theme that economics cannot establish what ought 
to count as harm and injury, they are frequently mentioned 
by various critics, and they become important for interpreting 
Posner's later writings. First, it is argued that a truly
complete theory of law would not be limited in its application 
to considerations involving market prices. In other words, 
there are many forms of cost which influence behavior, 
though they never find monetary expression. A complete 
theory must deal with these costs also, not just for reform­
ative but for explanative purposes also. Economic decisions, 
after all, incorporate more than monetary valuations.
Second, willingness and ability to pay is dependent 
upon the distribution of wealth and income. Change the 
distribution and the pattern of effective demand is changed 
also. Thus wealth maximization is dependent upon the under­
lying distribution of wealth and income. In this sense, 
then, the economic analysis is less than complete. This 
fact has been an important source of criticism of the "new" 
law and economics.
Chapters III and IV review the critiques put forth 
by the Austrians, the American Institutionalists and various 
legal theorists. While these groups consider different 
aspects of the "new" law and economics, taken together 
their critiques support the view that economics cannot 
give rise to a complete theory of law. Each of their critiques 
is shown to be encompassed within the general thesis that 
economics cannot deal adequately with the substantive questions 
regarding what constitutes harm and injury —  what value 
maximization consists in.
To this point the dissertation is largely a negative 
critique of the "new" law and economics. In order to
establish positively what economics can contribute to legal 
theory, it is necessary first to discuss the nature and 
scope of economic science in general. This is the purpose 
of Chapter V. It is argued that the significance of economics 
has been misunderstood by most, even by those economists 
who restrict its significance to the analysis of choice 
and the implications of economic efficiency. Chapter V 
develops the position that "economic efficiency" is of 
dubious scientific value (since it rests ultimately on 
invalid utility comparisons) and that the significance 
of economic science derives essentially from its analysis 
of choice behavior.
Upon this conception of economic science an alternative, 
though restricted, kind of law and economics is proposed 
in Chapter VI. This type of analysis is shown to be relevant 
to virtually all categories of the law, but concerns only 
instrumental considerations. It calls for a broad application 
of economic principles, yet is subservient to political 
and moral wisdom. Instead of claiming to avoid substantive 
rationality, it urges a return to serious moral discourse.
This analysis is called, for want of a more meticulous 
word, the "prudential" law and economics.
It is acknowledged that what follows can accomplish, 
at most, a small deflection toward the course that law 
and economics must travel if it is to be genuinely useful 
and, for that matter, if it is ever to be fully accepted 
by the legal profession. Unfortunately, many of the non-
economist critics are artless in their approach to economic 
methodology, especially the highly formalized analysis 
of choice, while many economists fail to recognize its 
inherent limitations. The result is a tendency toward 
polarization: that economic analysis of law is either
all bad or all good. The position developed in this paper 
seeks to avoid these antipodal viewpoints, and it is hoped 
that despite its negative aspects, it will help clear the 
way for a proper marriage of law and economics.
Notes to Chapter I
'''Richard Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (Boston: 
Little, Brown and Co., 1977), p. 16.
2Guido Calabresi, "Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution 
and the Law of Torts", Yale L J 499 (1961).
"^Ronald H. Coase, "The Problem of Social Cost", JLE 1 
( 1960) .
4Posner, o p . c i t . note 1, at 17.
^Ibid. , p. 10.
Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (London: 
Cadell and Davies, 1812), p. 381.
^Richard Posner, "Utilitarianism, Economics and Legal 
Theory", J L Stud. VIII (Jan., 1979): 127.
II. The Evolution of Law and Economics
A. Introduction
A comprehensive review of the "new" law and economics 
literature in all its many fields would be impractical, 
unwieldy and of little value to the present study. Therefore 
the following review will be limited to those seminal articles 
which marked significant turning points in the theoretical 
and methodological evolution of law and economics. The 
most important leaders in this evolution are Guido Calabresi, 
Ronald Coase, Gary Becker, and most essentially, Richard 
Posner. A discussion of their work will reveal that the 
evolution of this field followed a path marked by three 
related, yet distinct methodological approaches.
The first of these approaches was conceived by Ronald 
Coase in his seminal article, "The Problem of Social Cost."'*'
He rejects the Pigovian analysis of social cost, which proceeded 
in terms of a divergence between the "private" and 'feocial" 
costs of economic activity, and adopts an approach which 
stresses the reciprocal nature of social costs. In the 
latter analysis some degree of harm and injury accompanies 
virtually all activities, and the problem for policy purposes 
is to identify the activity which results in the least 
net social cost. This identification is supposed to be
1 2
made by "the market", in terms of the market prices of 
goods and services.
This approach is essentially instrumentalist, since 
it implicitly recognizes, yet does not claim to settle, 
the crucial substantive question of which prices are to 
count in the calculation of social cost.
A second approach which characterizes much of the
2
pre-Posnerian law and economics, especially Gary Becker's 
work on crime in the latter 1960's and early 1970's, begins 
by merely assuming a consensus on what constitutes harm 
and injury. The analysis then proceeds to derive various 
conclusions regarding "optimal" social policy on the basis 
of economic principles, particularly the axioms of individual 
choice behavior. As the Coasian approach described above, 
the "Becker" approach is cost oriented, and Becker recognizes 
the need for a consensus on fundamental, substantive issues 
in order to decide what counts for policy decisions. Becker's 
explicit assumption of a consensus for the sake of argument 
establishes the instrumentalist nature of his analysis.
The difference between their approaches, and the real signifi­
cance of Becker's work, is that he extended the individual- 
choice model of behavior into areas that were previously 
considered unamenable to economic analysis. Previous analysis, 
including that of Coase in the early 1960s, did not explicitly 
involve the axioms of individual choice behavior —  certainly 
not in the rigorous, mathematical style of Becker.
The third and most ambitious approach is that of
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3Richard Posner. He does not accept market prices as his 
starting point in the manner of Coase, and neither does 
he merely assume, with Becker, the necessary consensus 
on substantial matters. Posner is unwilling to settle 
for such an instrumentalist law and economics. Therefore 
he proposes to begin by answering some very fundamental 
substantive questions (regarding, for instance, human rights 
and the distribution of wealth) and to do so entirely within 
the context of economics. Thus he claims to be able to 
talk about what should constitute harm and injury (or 
what has value, to state the matter in stronger-sounding 
terms) without ever having to go beyond the realm of economic 
science. Posner's methodology represents an attempt to 
offer a more substantive economic theory of law than had 
been developed previously, in his own words, "a firmer 
basis for a normative theory of law. . .
Posner's methodology has been attacked by numerous 
critics, the more important of whom were mentioned 
in Chapter I. These critiques are discussed at some length 
in later chapters. The purpose of the present chapter, 
though, is to describe and interpret the evolution of law 
and economics. The discussion begins with Coase and Calabresi, 
then moves to Becker and finally Posner. Posner is given 
the most extensive treatment, of course, since his approach 
is the most ambitious and the least instrumentalist. It 
is, therefore, the approach this dissertation is most concerned 
to critique.
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B. How to Think About Social Cost
One of the earliest, and perhaps the single most important 
theoretical development in the evolution of law and economics 
was the break from Pigovian analysis of social cost and 
subsequent adoption of the approach first articulated in 
1960 by Ronald Coase in his well-known article, "The Problem 
of Social Cost".'’ Prior to Coase's pathbreaking article 
the analysis of social cost proceeded generally along the 
lines developed by Pigou in The Economics of Welfare.
In the Pigovian analysis, "private" costs, which are internal 
to the firm's decision making, were distinguished from 
"externalities", or costs which are external to the firm.
If, for instance, externalities are negative, the true social 
cost of production exceeds the cost recognized by the firm; 
therefore, when the profit-maximizing firm equates marginal 
revenue and marginal costs — its own, private costs —  
output is carried beyond the socially optimal level. However, 
forcing the firm to internalize the external costs will 
result in a full accounting of social costs, and efficiency 
will be achieved with adjustments in the profit-maximizing 
level of output.
The standard example is that of a factory which emits 
pollutants that are harmful to those occupying neighboring 
property. It is reasoned that if the owner of the factory 
were forced to consider the external costs of his activity 
the socially optimal reduction in output would result.
Thus the Pigovian analysis suggests the factory owner be
16
held liable for harm done to the neighboring persons and 
their property, or, as a possible alternative, that he 
be required to meet clean air standards.
This "externality" approach assumes the factory inflicts
harm on its neighbors, but not vice versa. It is this
perspective on the relationship between the two parties
which Coase questioned:
The traditional approach has tended to 
obscure the nature of the choice that 
has to be made. The question is 
commonly thought of as one in which A 
inflicts harm on B and what has to be 
decided is how should we restrain A?
But this is wrong. We are dealing with 
a problem of a reciprocal nature. To
avoid the harm to B would inflict harm
on A. The real question that has to be 
decided is: should A be allowed to harm
B, or should B be allowed to harm A?
The problem is to avoid the more serious
h a r m .
Considering again the example of the polluting factory, 
the Coasian and Pigovian approaches could lead to different 
legal actions. For instance, if it were estimated that 
cleanup costs to the factory exceeded the costs inflicted 
upon adjacent property owners, liability would not be assigned 
to the factory owners. Another example, in this case involving 
the perennial debate over strict liability and negligence, 
suggests the extent to which one's approach to social cost 
determines one's thinking on legal policy. Consider the 
problem of railroad crossing accidents. It is sometimes 
argued that only a rule of strict liability compels a firm 
to internalize fully all of its social costs. But with 
railroad crossing accidents, a standard of strict liability
17
might result in an inefficient solution. It may seem that 
strict liability would improve safety in the long run by 
forcing the railroad to take precautions that would reduce 
accidents to the "socially optimal" level. This reasoning 
ignores, however, the fact that strict liability, though 
it would increase the railroad's incentive to undertake 
safety precautions, reduces the potential victim's willingness 
to do the same. Under the negligence standard, the victims 
of unavoidable accidents— accidents which could be avoided 
by the offender only at very high costs— must bear the 
full cost of the accidents. It might, then, be advisable 
to consider the relative costs of prevention, not merely 
who injures whom. The Coasian approach opens the problem 
to this kind of analysis, allowing for a fuller examination 
on the basis of relative costs. The analysis should consider, 
for example, the likelihood that technological advancements 
can occur in particular areas at a justifiable cost. How 
expensive would it be, for example, to develop and employ 
car buzzers to warn drivers of approaching trains? And 
how does this cost compare with the development of better 
warning signals stationed at crossings?
The Coasian approach is essentially instrumentalist.
While the analysis in "The Problem of Social Cost" proceeds 
in terms of the market value of various alternatives, Coase 
himself is careful to point out that he is merely describing 
a methodology, not addressing more fundamental substantive 
questions regarding which valuations and other kinds of
"cost" ought to count:
In this article, the analysis has been 
confined, as is usual in this part of 
economics, to comparisons of the value 
of production, as measured by the market.
But it is, of course, desirable that the 
choice between different social arrange­
ments for the solution of economic problems 
should be carried out in broader terms 
than this and that the total effect of
these arrangements in all sphere of life
should be taken into account. As Frank 
H. Knight has so often emphasized, problems 
of welfare economics must ultimately dissolve 
into a study of aesthetics and morals.
The Coasian analysis is not only more extensive than 
the Pigovian, but seems to have greater explanatory power 
regarding the actual structure of the law. There are certain 
instances in which strict liability is the usual standard, 
including such cases as dynamite blasting accidents, attacks 
by vicious animals, and other cases in which the potential 
victims are not efficient accident avoiders. Likewise, 
there are cases which are almost always handled under negli­
gence, and these are, as one might expect, cases in which
the victim is the least-cost avoider. While the Pigovian
approach is generally consistent only with strict liability, 
the Coasian approach can lead to either standard, depending 
upon the nature of the case. Thus the Coasian approach 
is much more consistent with the actual structure of the 
law, and this is no doubt a major reason for the pervasiveness 
of it in the "new" law and economics.
19
C. Calabresi and Becker: The Beginnings of a Universal
Law and Economics
Epistemologist Karl Popper described the proper growth 
of science as a process in which explanatory theories become 
increasingly universal. By universal he meant applicable 
to a wide range of phenomena: the more universal a theory
is, the more apparently different kinds of activity it can 
bring within its domain without resorting to aji hoc rational­
ization. Law and economics has evolved in much the way Popper 
suggests, and one purpose of this section is to describe 
the methodological changes which, beginning in the early 
1960's, led to a more universal (and a more ambitious) law 
and economics than most economists and legal theorists had 
previously envisioned.
In 1960 Guido Calabresi published his now-classic article,
g
"Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts."
There are, as one would expect, some scattered allusions 
to economic principles in previous discussions of torts, 
but the Calabresi article is one of the best early examples 
of a study that systematically applies sophisticated economic 
theory to an area of the law which was previously understood 
mainly in noneconomic (sometimes moralistic) concepts and 
terms.
Calabresi examines whether, and in what ways, considera­
tions of risk distribution should guide the formulation and 
administration of tort law. The central policy issue is 
whether the principal criterion of liability is to be
based on "fault" or on the distribution of risk and loss.
Calabresi feels that one useful approach to considerations
of risk and loss distribution is 'to draw upon the principles
of economics, though he is almost apologetic in saying
so. His words also carry considerable irony in light of
more recent criticisms of law and economics:
To decide when and how we wish to 
distribute losses we must, there­
fore, examine the theoretical justi- 
ciations . . . often, unfortunately,
in that most dismal of theories, 
economics. Hopefully, it will do so 
in terms which are intelligible to 
law teachers, if not to lawyers, and 
without that suicidal desire of the
economist to make his theory so
pervasive and detailed that it^is 
rendered utterly useless . . .
As mentioned above, one important characteristic of 
Calabresi's 1960 piece that was of real significance for 
the evolution of law and economics is the sophistication 
of its economic rationality--price theory, in particular.
The cornerstone of his analysis is what he calls the "resource- 
allocation theory", according to which liability ought 
to be assigned in such a way as to cause the least possible 
distortion of the true configuration of relative prices.
The true configuration of relative prices here refers to
that configuration which correctly represents the relative 
social costs of the activites in question. Calabresi's 
example of liability in automobile accidents demonstrates 
how the theory would be applied. He considers two ways 
of dealing with the social cost of automobile accidents:
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One way is to hold the offending driver, the one who caused
the accident, strictly liable for all damages. An alternative
way is to charge the state with all accident-related costs,
in effect eliminating driver liability altogether. Calabresi
finds the latter unacceptable according to the resource-
allocation theory:
The fact is that if the cost of all
auto accidents were suddenly to be
paid out of a general government 
fund the expense of owning a car
would be a lot lower than it is now
since people would no longer need to 
worry about buying insurance; the 
result would be that some people 
would buy more cars . . . [But] an
economist would say, resources are 
misallocated in the goods we produced 
which the purchaser would not want if 
he really had to pay the full extent 
of their cost to society— this cost, 
whether in terms of the physical 
, components of the item or of the
expense of the accidents ass^giated 
with its production and use.
It might seem that Calabresi's treatment of social 
cost is essentially Pigovian, especially with the emphasis 
on cost being reflected in prices which in turn lead to the 
correct or optimal quantity traded on the market. Actually, 
Calabresi's approach is quite Coasian. Note that in the 
auto accident example Calabresi never really says the offending 
driver alone should bear the costs of accidents. He says 
that drivers of automobiles in general, rather than the 
government, should bear those costs. Consider also 
Calabresi's discussion of job-related accident liability.
The over-riding consideration is not whose fault an accident
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is, but whose prevention costs are less:
[I]nsurance may cost one party less 
than it costs another. If that is 
so, the proper party to bear the risk 
is the party whose insurance costs 
are lower. For only then are the 
true costs of injuries and not some 
false costs of more expensiv|^in­
surance, reflected in price.
A statement of the resource-allocation theory is only 
the starting point in Calabresi's study. The major part 
of his paper discusses how the theory would operate within 
the context of various market structures, from very competitivei
to monopolistic, and for this he draws upon rather sophisticated 
price theory. A mere enumeration of the structures and 
relationships discussed reveals much about the sophistica­
tion of his analysis. He considers, among other things, 
cost-plus pricing models, lump-sum versus per unit taxation, 
elasticity of substitution in the use of inputs, forward 
and backward shifting of risk with regard to market structure, 
the effect of cost increases on prices in various kinds 
of market structure (employing more sophisticated oligopolistic 
and "imperfectly competitive" pricing models). The following 
passage, though relatively short, conveys the tone and 
some feel for the complexity of his analysis:
[I]n some situations where com­
petitive industries produce goods 
which are reasonably close substitutes 
for the products of relatively mono­
polistic industries, a favorable 
resource-allocation effect follows 
from enterprise liability. Undoubtedly, 
there are also situations where enter­
prise liability would cause no resource 
allocation effect at all. Such a
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situation might be one in which 
industries producing rough substitutes 
were each oligopolistic and failed 
to change price and output as a result 
of increased costs (or where the added 
costs were fixed as to output), and in 
which all firms in the industries 
involved were making sufficient extra 
profits to survive the loss in profits
It is important to note that while Calabresi embraces 
an economic approach, he implies, as does Coase, that it 
is essentially instrumental, not substantive. Unfortunately 
Calabresi is not quite so clear about the need for "aesthetics 
and morals" as a basis for actual policy decisions:
[We] are interested in seeing how 
strong the bases are for each of our 
various things we call risk distribu­
tion. If it turns out that these 
bases are strong, it may be assumed 
that the policies in favor of other 
criteria for allocating losses, like 
fault, are weakened by comparison.
' It need not follow that these other
not dominate in all^gr in some areas 
where losses occur.
Again, Calabresi seems to be implying that economics 
has its limitations, but he is somewhat vague as to what 
they are. The point is not that economists must become 
philosophers; it is that the theorist who would challenge 
traditional thought with a new analysis has the responsibility 
to determine as nearly as possible the limitations of his 
analysis. In short, he should say precisely what he is 
about. Law economists have usually failed to do so.
Calabresi's analysis proceeds almost entirely within 
the context of the firm rather than the household or the
entaij.gd by such an unshiftable cost 
item.
, even if weakened, should
individual.- In later studies, especially theories about
criminal activity, the individual-choice approach proved
to be quite fruitful, especially in the work of Gary Becker.
In "Crime and Punishment: An Economic App r o a c h , " ^  published
in 1968, Becker applied the individual-choice model in
a path-breaking analysis of criminal activity. The essence
of Becker's pronouncement reads:
Theories about the determinants of 
the number of offenses differ greatly, 
from emphasis on skull types and 
biological inheritance to family 
upbringing and disenchantment with 
society . .
The approach taken here follows 
the economists' usual analysis of 
choice and assumes that a person 
commits an offense if the expected 
utility to him exceeds the utility he 
could get by using his time and other 
resources at other activities . . .
This approach implies that there 
is a function relating the number of 
offenses by any person to his proba­
bility of conviction, to his punish­
ment if convicted, and to other 
variables, such as the income avail­
able to him in legal and other illegal 
activities, the frequency of nuisance 
arrests, and hi|,-willingness to commit 
an illegal act.
Becker represents this function as
0. = 0 .(P . , F . , U.)J J J J J
where 0 . is the number of offenses one would commit during 
a particular period, P . the probability of conviction per 
offense, Fj the punishment per offense, and U . a portman­
teau variable representing other i n f l u ences.^
Clearly Becker's approach is an attempt to understand
crime in terms of a more general theory of human action,
and in this sense he is universalizing the economic analysis
of law. Becker himself is quite explicit about this:
Some persons become "criminals", there­
fore, not because their basic motivation 
differs from that of other persons, but 
because their benefits and costs differ.
I cannot pause here to discuss the many 
general implications of this approach 
except to remark that criminal behavior 
becomes part of a much more general 
theory and does not require ad hoc 
concepts of differential association, 
anomie, and the like . . .
Elsewhere he has written:
It is my belief that economic analysis 
is essential in understanding much of
the behavior traditionally studied by
sociologists, anthropologists, and 
other social scientists. This is a 
true example of economic imperialism!
The sophistication of Becker's analysis is generally 
acknowledged and need not be demonstrated here. In this 
connection it might be pointed out that Becker felt it 
necessary to add an extensive mathematical appendix to 
"Crime and Punishment". The appropriateness of mathematics
is touched upon again in Chapter V. Suffice it here to
say that Becker's use of mathematics is not scientistic 
window dressing; there is a genuine need for mathematics 
because of the sophistication and complexity of his model.
It will be argued that Becker intends his analysis 
to be instrumental, and not concerned with substantive 
questions about the harm and injury associated with different 
activities. Some critics have interpreted his work otherwise.
H. H. Liebhafsky, for instance, humorously stated that
"Becker has presented an alternative to the view of Feoder
19Dostoevski". It will be left to the reader to decide
whether the variable IK, which represents the criminal’s
"willingness to commit an illegal act" is a measure of
original sin; Becker himself does not use such terminology.
But, as Calabresi before him, Becker does speak deferentially
of the role of moral consideration in policy decisions:
Reasonable men will often differ on the 
amount of damages or benefits caused by 
different activities. To some any wage 
rates set by competitive labor markets 
are permissible, while to others, rates 
below a certain minimum are violations 
of basic rights. To some, gambling, 
prostitution, and even abortion should 
be freely available, to anyone willing 
to pay the market price, while to others, 
gambling is sinful and abortion is 
murder. These differences are basic to 
the development and implementation of 
public policy but have been excluded 
from my inquiry. I assume consensus on 
damages and benefits and simply try to 
work out rules for an optimal implemen­
tation of this consensus.
The main contribution of this essay, 
as I see it, is to demonstrate that 
optimal policies to combat illegal 
behavior are |grt of an optimal allocation 
of resources.
One might argue that Becker is simply doing an econo­
mist's job in the spirit of ceteris paribus: Setting aside
considerations of morality, what does economics alone suggest 
in terms of "efficiency" and "optimality conditions"?
But such a response misses the point, for it accepts an 
artificial distinction between efficiency and morality.
It will be helpful to consider further what Becker means
when he says that he has "assumed consensus on damages
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and benefits." His analysis assumes consensus on the criterion
that "the loss function [i.e., the real cost of crime]
is identical with the total social loss in real income
21from offenses, convictions and punishments . . ." Thus
he has not merely assumed a consensus; he has assumed a
particular moral judgment on "the amount of damages or
benefits caused by different activities". Thus it is a
bit misleading for him to state that differences of opinion
about the value of certain activites "have been excluded
22from my inquiry". The implication seems to be that one
can separate "efficiency" and ethics. To do so is, however,
impossible, for the derivation of optimality conditions,
i.e., efficiency, necessarily proceeds on the basis of
prior judgments about the value of certain activities.
One wishes that Becker were more clear about the limitations
of economic analysis in policy-making, and particularly
about what is embodied in his assumption of consensus on
moral opinion.
Still, one must infer that Becker intends his approach
to be essentially instrumental. He does, after all, state
explicitly that the purpose of his analysis of crime is
"to work out the rules for an optimal implementation of 
23this consensus" --and, it is reasonable to assume, any 
other "given" consensus.
The analyses of Coase, Calabresi and Becker are partial, 
rather than complete, most importantly because they accept 
or assume aesthetic and moral judgments which lie outside
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of the realm of economics and are preliminary to the efficiency 
conclusions eventually derived. They begin, in other words, 
with "given" judgments about what constitutes harm and 
injury. There are two other senses, less important than 
the first, in which their analyses may be said to be partial, 
not complete: (1 ) they proceed largely in terms of market
prices and money income instead of the more universal concept 
of utility, or "want satisfaction", and (2 ) they implicitly 
accept some given distribution of income and wealth. These 
two points are not completely unrelated to the first, of 
course. They require further comment here.
The ultimate end-product of economic activity--the 
ultimate purpose of purposive action— is considered in 
modern economic theory not to be physical output or even 
profit, but the completely general concept of "utility".
In Marshall's Principles of Economics and other great neo­
classical works, the theory of demand was based on utility 
analysis. The idea of utility made possible a general 
theory that could explain the "economizing" aspect of 
behavior with respect to all the many different kinds of 
"economic goods", both tangible and intangible. Economic 
theory thus became much more general, and much more power­
ful when it recognized that, as Milton Friedman put it, 
all goods "have some common characteristic that makes
comparisons among them possible. This common characteristic
2 <4is usually called utility." Though Becker resorts to 
a monetary standard of measure in his social loss function,
he is explicit about the loss of generality this entails:
What is needed is a criterion that goes 
beyond catchy phrases . . . The social
welfare function of modern welfare 
economics is such a criterion . . .
It is more convenient and trans­
parent, however, to develop the discus­
sion at this point in terms of a less 
general formulation, namely to assume 
that the loss function is identical with 25 
the total social loss in real income . . .
The Coasian analysis of social cost is conducted almost
entirely in terms of the dollar value of various products.
Consider his comments on an example in which the machinery
used by a confectioner created a noise nuisance for a doctor
occupying part of the same building:
The doctor would have been willing to 
waive his right and allow the machinery 
to continue if the confectioner would 
have paid him a sum of money which was 
greater than the loss of income which he 
would suffer from having to move to a 
more costly or less convenient location 
or from having to c u r t ^ l  his activities 
at this location . . .
Calabresi also relies upon market prices to reach
particular conclusions about risk distribution. Recall
the example discussed above in which the market price of
job-related accident insurance was largely determinant
in assigning liability for accidents. Even Becker's social
loss function is defined in terms of the monetary losses
due to crime. There is no direct mention of "utility"
in Coase's article, and though Calabresi does devote a
couple of pages to the utility of money, he implies that
27the utility of other goods is irrelevant. In his early
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analysis of tort law, it would seem that economic goods are 
one thing, "utility" quite another.
The analyses of Coase, Calabresi and Becker are partial 
analyses also in that their conclusions are particular to 
the underlying distribution of wealth and income. Even if 
one were to accept market prices as the appropriate data 
for economic analysis, one should not ignore the effect of 
wealth distribution on the structure of relative prices.
Change the distribution of wealth and you change the structure 
of prices, hence the derivative optimality conditions .
In this sense the conclusions are particular to the underlying 
distribution of wealth, and the analysis partial, not complete.
Coase, it will be remembered, suggested that the right 
of the confectioner to use his machinery is not absolute; 
nor is the doctor's right to quiet. Rather, the right would 
be allocated on the basis of willingness and ability to pay.
In this view the demand for the right in question is ultimately 
derived from the demand for the final product. Thus the 
distribution of income and wealth is potentially very 
important. It is likely, for instance, that if society exper­
ienced a redistribution of income from older to younger adults, 
the result would be a relative decline in the demand for 
medical services. Consequently,, there could be a reallocation 
of rights .
As stated above, the point that economic analysis depends 
upon prior judgments on the value of certain goods or
is especially important. This is true not
merely as it regards the theoretical completeness of law 
and economics, but because it gets to the very heart of 
problems in policy making. The derivation of economically 
efficient, or value-maximizing, solutions to social problems 
can only proceed on the basis of moral judgments made prior 
to the derivation itself. Consider, as an example, the 
constant debate over what to do about the "porno shops" 
in the French Quarter of New Orleans. One could readily 
apply the Becker analysis to this problem. After assuming 
a consensus about the value of such establishments one 
can specifiy a "social loss function" and then proceed 
to derive the "optimal" quantity of pornography. But, 
of course, there is no such consensus and this is the problem. 
Thus economics alone would seem to be of little use in 
those critical areas where there is disagreement on the 
moral and ethical issues.
The remainder of this chapter is devoted to Richard 
Posner. It will be argued that while his earlier statements 
on the nature of the economic analysis of law did suggest 
a more general view of law and economics than was shared 
by others before him, he nonetheless described a "partial" 
theory of law.
D. Richard Posner and Wealth Maximization
The best of the early Posner is found in his textbook,
2 8Economic Analysis of L a w , first published in 1972. Even 
here one gets the impression that Posner conceives of a more
universal theory of law than others have offered before
him. He describes the purpose of his book:
Subsequent chapters will show how the 
insights of Coase, Calabresi and Becker 
have been generalized . . . yielding an
economic theory of law with broad 
explanative and reformative power and 
with growing empirical support. These 
chapters will show that economics has 
both a normative and a positive role 
in the study law and legal 
institutions.
His comments on the significance of Coase suggest
what was later to be widely known as the principle of
wealth maximization :
Coase suggested that the English law 
of nuisance had an implicit economic 
logic. Later writers have generalized 
this insight and agreed that many of 
the doctrines and institutions of the 
legal system are best understood and 
explained as efforts to promote 
efficient allocation of resources.
In later writings Posner objectifies the general principle 
of wealth maximization and speaks of it, in the abstract, 
as a universal first principle for both positive and normative 
analysis of law.
In Economic Analysis of L a w , Posner defines "efficiency"
and "value" (later termed "wealth") as follows:
Efficiency means exploiting economic 
resources in such a way that "value"—  
human satisfaction as measured by 
aggregate consumer willingness and 
ability to pay^for goods and services—  
is maximized.
One might argue that Posner1s view is no more general 
than that of Becker, since both propose to measure value
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(or "social welfare" in Becker's analysis of crime) in monetary 
terms. Posner has never abandoned his "willingness and 
ability to pay"- measurement of value, and he has been attacked, 
especially by the Austrians, for not taking subjectivism 
seriously. More on this will come in Chapter III.
Austrian objections aside, his use of willingness
and ability to pay would seem to render his analysis partial
since ability to pay is largely determined by the distribution
of income. In earlier writings Posner conceded the point:
Willingness to pay, the basis of the 
efficiency and value concepts, is a 
function of many things, including 
the distribution of income and wealth.
Were income and wealth distributed 
differently, the pattern of demand 
might also be different and efficiency 
would require a different t^ployment 
of our economic resources.
Thus it would seem that economic rationality alone 
cannot arrive at a unique allocation of resources, or 
assignment of rights, unless and until the distribution 
of income and wealth is determined. There is no such 
concession in the later writings, however. Posner now 
argues precisely that economic rationality "ordains a system 
of exclusive rights" and "requires the initial vesting
33of rights in those who are likely to value them the most."
The proposition that economic rationality ordains a system 
of exclusive rights is not new with Posner, of course. 
Economists have long argued that incentives to produce 
and economize are created by the parceling out among the 
members of society of mutually exclusive rights to the
use of particular resources. What is significant in Posner'
later writing is that he claims to have arrived at a wealth 
(or efficiency) maximizing initial distribution of those 
rights:
It is true that if market trans­
actions were costless, it would be a 
matter of indifference to the econo­
mist where an exclusive right was 
initially vested. The process of 
voluntary exchange would costlessly 
reallocate the right to whoever valued 
it the most . . .  If transaction costs are 
positive, the wealth-maximization 
principle requires the initial vesting of 
rights in those who are likely to value 
them the most. This is the economic 
reason for giving a worker the right 
to sell his labor and a woman the 
right to determine her sexual part­
ners . . .  No doubt the inherent dif­
ficulties of borrowing against human 
capital would defeat some efforts by 
the natural owner to buy back the right 
of his labor or body even from someone 
who did not really value it more highly 
than he did— but that is simply a 
further reason for initially v e x i n g  
the right in the natural owner.
Posner thus introduces the idea of the natural owner: 
the one who values a thing the most as measured by willing­
ness and ability to pay. He distinguishes between the 
natural owner and the one who merely possesses a thing 
with the hypothetical example of a person who possesses 
a beautifully lustrous and pearly smile, but will not allow 
it to be photographed. Suppose that Colgate is 
willing and able to pay more for the right to photograph 
his smile than the owner is willing and able to pay to 
prevent the use of those pictures on billboards or in
magazines. Posner feels that in such a case it would
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35not involve "any contradiction or absurdity" to rule 
that the smile should be owned by Colgate.
Thus Posner has attempted to get around the distributional 
problems by contending that wealth maximization itself 
suggests the all-important initial distribution. "The 
crucial point" he declares, "is that the specific distribution 
of wealth is a mere by-product of a distribution of rights
that is itself derived from the wealth maximization principle.
3 6A just distribution of wealth need not be posited."
It has been suggested that Posner's rationality still 
involves a serious problem of circularity. That will be 
dealt with later; for now, the point is merely that Posner 
recognizes what is required of a truly general economic 
analysis of law with respect to the distribution of income 
criterion and has attempted to meet that requirement.
In his discussion of rights, Posner seems to be suggest­
ing that efficiency or wealth maximization is itself an 
ethical concept. In the early writings, however, Posner 
seemed no different from Becker and others who suggest 
that economic principles and normative (i.e., value) principles 
are conceptually distinct:
Some economics yields no answer to the 
questions whether the existing distribu­
tion of income and wealth is good or bad, 
just or unjust . . . neither does it
yield an answer to the ultimate question 
whether an efficient allocation of 
resources would be good, just or other­
wise socially or ethically desirable.
Nor can the economist tell us whether, 
assuming the existing distribution of 
income and wealth is just, consumer
36
satisfaction should be the dominant 
value of society. The economist's 
competence in a discussion of the legal 
system is thus strictly limited. He 
can predict the effect of legal rules and 
arrangements on value and efficiency, 
in this strict technical sense, and 
on the existing distribution of income 
and w e a ^ h .  He cannot prescribe social 
change.
"Utilitarianism, Economics and Legal Theory" changed
all this. Posner's introductory remarks clearly indicate
the differences between his earlier and later views on economics
and moral philosophy:
While nowadays relatively few of the 
people in our society . . . consider wealth
maximization or some other version of 
efficiency the paramount social value, 
few judge it a trivial one . . . Consequently,
the economist has an important contribution 
to make to ethical debate even if he is 
unable to give any philosophically coherent 
account of economic rationality.
But I am unwilling to let the 
matter rest there, for it seems to me 
that economic analysis has some claim to 
being regarded as a coherent and attrac^g 
tive basis for ethical judgments . . .
What has happened, it seems, is that the relationship between
economics and ethics has been stood on its head: whereas
the early Posner saw time-honored moral principles as vindicating
the idea of efficiency, the later Posner sees the "conventional
pieties", as they were to be called, as being grounded in
efficiency. Consider this earlier discussion in his textbook:
Surely, it will be aruged, the true
purpose of law, especially of law
embodied in the common law of England 
and the United States, is to correct 
injustices and thereby vindicate 
the moral sense.
In fact, there appears to be no 
fundamental inconsistency between
morality and efficiency. Moral prin­
ciples . . . serve in general to promote
efficiency.
Sometimes, to be sure, adherence 
to moral principles reduces the wealth 
of society— "honor among thieves" 
illustrates the point . . . But on balance
it would seem that the moral principles 
increase the wealth of society more 
than they reduce it . . .
Contrast the above remarks with his later statements
in "Utilitarianism":
Now it might seem that an ethical 
theory premised on one preference—  
the desire for wealth— must be inferior 
to an ethical theory which takes account 
of the whole set of preferences. But 
this is not necessarily so. First, as 
we shall see, the pursuit of wealth is 
more consistent with our intuitions 
concerning ethical behavior than the 
pursuit of happiness. Second, the 
wealth principle can more easily be made 
to yield the formal elements of an 
ethical theory— including notions of 
rights and of corrective justice-^han 
utilitarianism can be made to do.
Before, in the early writings, economic considerations
were not only distinct from, but by implication subordinate
to, moral considerations. This seems not to be his view
in later pronouncements. The following is also from
"Utilitarianism":
Other ethical values can also be grounded 
more firmly on wealth maximization than 
on utilitarianism. Economic liberty is 
an obvious example, given the almost uni­
versal opinion of economists (including 
Marxist economists) that free markets, 
whatever objections can be made to them 
on grounds of equity, maximize a society's 
wealth. This is, to be sure, an empirical 
judgment, but it rests on much firmer ground 
than the claim that free markets minimize 
happiness.
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Less obviously, most of the conven­
tional pieties--keeping promises, telling 
the truth, and the like— can also be 
derived from the wealth-maximization principle. 
Adherence to these virtues facilitates 
transactions (and so promotes trade and 
hence wealth) by reducing the costs of 
policing markets through self-protection, 
detailed contracts, litigation, etc.
Even altruism (benevolence) can be ^
interpreted as an economizing principle.
A few words of summary are in order. In the early 
writings, Posner seemed to be saying that economics 
is a handmaiden science and instrumental in its rationality.
He suggested that economic principles are separate from and 
subordinate to moral and ethical principles, and he saw the 
conclusions of economic analysis as dependent, to a large 
degree, upon the initial distribution of income and wealth. 
Surely it would be accurate to say that he viewed law and 
economics as a partial rather than a complete science of 
law. It has been suggested, however, that his view has changed. 
He now sees the economic analysis of law as theoretically 
complete, and substantive in the sense that fundamental moral 
and ethical principles are derived from the economic rationality 
itself.
In Posner's vision, economics offers a theoretically
complete analysis of the law. A final quotation from
"Utilitarianism" buttresses this interpretation:
To recapitulate, the wealth-maximiza­
tion principle implies, first, an ini­
tial distribution of individual rights 
(to life, liberty, and labor) to their 
natural owners; second, free markets to 
enable those rights to be reassigned 
from time to time to other uses; third,
39
legal rules that simulate the operations 
of the market when the costs of market 
transactions are prohibitive; fourth, 
a system of legal remedies for deterring 
and redressing invasions of rights; and 
fifth, a system of personal morality 
(the "Protestant virtues") that serves to 
reduce the costs of market transactions.
Were the traditional common law fields 
to be reorganized along more functional 
lines, the first of these areas would be 
the domain of property law, the second 
of contract law, the third of tort law, 
and the fourth of procedujrgl and remedial 
(including criminal) law.
E. Concluding Remarks
This chapter has described and interpreted the crucial
phases in the evolution of law and economics. It was shown
that the economic analysis of law has become, since 1960,
increasingly general and sophisticated. Still, the analyses
developed by Coase, Calabresi, Becker and the early Posner
were essentially instrumental and theoretically incomplete.
They did not claim to address substantive questions about
what constitutes harm and injury. In his later writings,
however, Posner has made a valiant effort to expand the economic
analysis of law into a fully complete theory of jurisprudence,
one which is able to answer the substantive questions.
A couple of problems were suggested. First, the Austrians 
argue that Posner fails to recognize the difficulties imposed 
by a subjective view of cost and benefit. Second, there 
is the charge that Posner's attempt to derive the initial 
or "natural" allocation of rights involves a serious problem 
of circularity. The latter point, and related thoughts on 
the insufficiency of wealth-maximization as a normative "first
principle" have been discussed at length by the American Insti­
tutionalists. Before final judgment can be passed on Posner's 
approach, these and other problems must be explored. To 
this purpose Chapters III and IV will review the critiques 
put forth by the Austrians, the American Institutionalists 
and various legal theorists.
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III. The Austrians and the Institutionalists
A . Introduction
This chapter reviews two important critiques of the 
"new" law and economics. In one, made most forcefully by 
those of the Austrian School, it is con-tended that an unbridge­
able chasm exists between a truly objective theory of wealth 
maximization and the subjectivistic microeconomics in which 
it would be grounded, and that taking subjectivism seriously 
implies the impossibility of "engineering" wealth maximization. 
The other critique has been best developed by the American 
Institutionalists, who argue that value maximization based 
on willingness and ability to pay is a presumptive precept, 
for it requires some antecedent premise as to the rights 
that determine willingness and ability to pay. Wealth- 
maximizing solutions are actually determined, in the Institution­
alists' view, by decisions made prior to the calculation 
of value.
It is necessary to review these important critiques 
in order to assess fully the "new" law and economics, especially 
Posner's principle of value maximization. Also, it will 
be shown that both critiques support the central thesis that 
economics does not answer substantive questions regarding 
what constitutes harm and injury.
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B. Taking Subjectivism Seriously
The Austrians have developed most thoroughly the impli­
cations of subjectivism for economic theory in general, and 
they have not been silent in the area of law and economics.
Before considering particular arguments, it will be helpful 
to review the essential tenets of the Austrian, or "subjectivist" 
critique. Briefly stated, they are as follows:
1. Value is subjective and exists only in the 
mind of the decision maker.
2. Value cannot be measured by someone other than 
the chooser since there is no way that subjective 
mental experiences can be directly observed.
3. Value is forward-looking (ex ante) and is based 
on anticipations.
4. In a world of uncertainty, economic goods will
be evaluated differently by different individuals, 
and there is no objective way of discerning a 
priori whose evaluations are correct.
5. Only when the economy is in full, general 
equilibrium would market prices accurately 
represent value.
6 . The economy is never in full equilibrium; 
only a dynamic view of economic processes 
approaches reality.
7. The divergence from equilibrium is probably 
most significant when economic theory informs 
public policy. There is really no way for
the court or legislature to know a wealth- 
maximizing assignment when they see one, and 
to pretend that they do could have far- 
reaching, unintended and undesirable conse­
quences .
The subjectivists contend that the relevance of the
principles enumerated above to economic analysis of the law
is lost on many economists, especially those of the
"Chicago" school. Subjectivists argue that some theorists
do not recognize at all the subjective nature of value, while
others try to get around the inherent problems by proposing
to measure value in terms of willingness and ability to pay.
In other words, some analyses ignore subjectivism, while
others fail to take it seriously. In an attack on Coase's
discussion of social cost , S. C. Littlechild’*' follows Hayek
in stressing that economic "data" are necessarily subjecti-
vistic in nature. Hayek himself wrote that:
. . . most of the objects of social or
human action are not "objective facts" 
in the special narrow sense in which 
this term is used by the Sciences and 
contrasted to "opinions", and they 
cannot at all be defined in physical 
terms. So far as human actions are 
concerned, the things are what^ the 
acting people think they are.
The implications of a subjectivist perception of value 
are far-reaching, and perhaps most obvious in cases involving 
"hypothetical" markets. The subjectivist critique stresses 
the impossibility of accurate assessments of value by the 
court when transaction costs prohibit explicit bargaining.
Littlechild has this to say about such cases:
It might be conceded that, in practice, 
the likely outcomes of any particular 
measure are unsure, but it is necessary 
to make a "best guess". This element 
of subjectivity of course raises the 
difficulties referred to in the last 
section. Whose guess is appropriate 
for policy purposes, and how is the 
efficiency of the guessing procedure to 
be ascertained? Moreover, there is a 
crucial difference between this situation 
and that of the private firm in that no 
ultimate objective check on efficiency 
is available: If the decision-making
procedure is inefficient, there is no 
direct feedback comparable to ^hat of 
financial loss and bankruptcy. /
Difficulties inherent in the ability to observe directly
the subjective valuations of others are compounded when a
dynamic analysis replaces the usual static-equilibrium
approach. Not only are subjective valuations intangible,
they are forever subject to change, and this potentiality
for change introduces the . additional uncertainty that makes
calculations of value impossible. Karen Vaughn has succintly
explained why subjectivism implies a dynamic approach to
economic analysis:
Each person evalutes the alternatives open 
to him within the context of uncertainty 
about the likelihood of expected out­
comes, ignorance of the total realm of 
alternatives open to him and the possi­
bilities of error in judgment about the 
value to him of the alternatives he does 
perceive. In such a world, it would seem 
to be purely happenstance if two separate 
individuals were to evaluate the same set 
of alternatives in the same ways. Thus 
the central problem of economic analysis 
in this context.is to explain how millions 
of separate individuals with differing 
perceptions of reality and differing 
valuations and expectations about the
future ever manage to achieve any kind of 
coordination of economic activity. With 
such an understanding of the purpose of 
economic theory it is the very subjectiv­
ity, ignorance, error and uncertainty 
confronting man that helps to explain the 
development and persistence of markets as 
corrective and coordinating institutions.
That is, markets enable individuals to 
compare their subjective judgment with 
the evaluations of others in a continual 
process of giving and receiving informa- ^ 
tion relevant to economic decision making.
In Vaughn's understanding of economic theory, the 
notion of static equilibrium is virtually irrelevant, the
dynamic process of adjustment to new and changing informa­
tion being the true subject of analysis. Israel Xirzner also 
has stressed that static equilibrium is of little importance 
in the subjectivist's "dynamic" approach:
As a matter of considerable theoretical 
interest we may investigate the possi­
bility of a state of affairs in which 
no market ignorance is present. We would
then have a pattern of perfectly dovetail­
ing decisions. No decision made will fail 
to be carried out, and no opportunity will 
fail to be exploited. Each market partici­
pant will have correctly forecast all the 
relevant decisions of others; he will have 
laid his plans fully cognizant of what he 
will be unable to do in the market, but at 
the same time fully awake to what he i_ŝ 
able to do in the market. Clearly, with 
such a state of affairs the market process 
must immediately cease. Without autonomous 
changes in tastes, or in technological 
possibilities, or in the availability of 
resources, no one can have any interest in 
altering his plans for the succeeding 
periods. The market is in equilibrium; 
the pattern of market activity will gontinue 
without change period after period.
The implication for wealth maximization is that even
explicit prices in actual markets are not very helpful, for
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they are almost certain to be disequilibrium prices, hence
once removed from the true social opportunity costs they
are supposed to represent. Mario Rizzo has commented on
disequilibrium prices in the context of the perennial debate
over negligence and strict liability:
Suppose that in order to avoid an accident 
with an expected cost of $100, A 
must spend $80 on resources which are 
disequilibrium-priced. B, on the 
other hand, must spend $90 on similarly 
priced resources if he is to avoid 
the accident. If the court responds 
only to existing market prices and 
seeks to place liability on the 
cheaper-cost avoider, A will be 
held liable. However, existing market 
prices do not reflect true social 
opportunity costs when they are not 
at their general equilibrium values 
. . . This will be the case, for
example, if the general equilibrium 
price of A's resources is $95 
while that of B 's^(different) 
resources is $85.
Coase, Posner and others in the Chicago tradition have 
stressed the difficulty of estimating the market price in 
hypothetical markets, but seem quite willing to accept the 
market price, when it is explicitly given, as the equilibrium 
price. The more fundamental question for subjectivists is 
not whether the market price can be discovered, but whether 
that price expresses true social costs— whether, in other 
words, equilibrium can be assumed to have obtained. Subject­
ivism taken seriously implies a concept of equilibrium such 
that it surely cannot be assumed to have obtained.
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Another problem in dynamic analysis, as Littlechild
points out, is that of specifying the time span over which
the relevant costs and benefits are to be measured:
If economic activity is viewed, not 
as an equilibrium state, but as a 
process involving changing percep­
tions and values, then it is not 
clear at what time, or after what 
period of reflection, it is appropri-  ̂
ate to calculate the value of product.
Rizzo examines a specific case, again in the context 
of the negligence— liability debate, in which a pedestrian 
is struck by a subway train. If one were to consider a rather 
broad time span, perhaps the pedestrian could avoid the 
accident at least cost by simply not walking near the tracks. 
However, Rizzo points out that if the time span is restrict­
ed to the moments just before the accident, the least-cost
g
avoider might well be the subway operator. How is the court
to decide what time span to use in determining who was negligent?
The general point of Rizzo's critique is to argue that a
strict liability approach ought to be taken instead of a
negligence approach in virtually all cases because the latter
cannot be made operational due to the difficulties in measuring
social cost:
Negligence can be defined in economic 
terms as the behavior of the utility- 
maximizing individual when he bears 
less than the full social costs of his 
activity. To make such a definition 
operational the analyst must be able 
to measure, with tolerablegaccuracy, 
the relevant social costs.
Gerald O'Driscoll also rejects the negligence approach
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but his critique transcends that of Rizzo. O'Driscoll goes
beyond the difficulty of measuring social costs, and suggests
that the very idea of inefficient behavior is dubious:
The parties to any dispute subject to 
adjudication will ordinarily have 
formed different expectations on the 
basis of different data. E_x post, at 
most one party will have been correct 
. . . It will not do to suggest that the
judge adopt the efficient course of 
action. Ex_ ante, both parties to a 
dispute were efficiently a^Jocating 
their means to their ends.
One might argue that the negligence approach is based 
-on precisely the assumption that persons do act efficiently 
on the basis of perceived costs; therefore, holding persons 
responsible for certain costs (i.e., internalizing certain 
social costs) will result in behavior that is, in the context 
of society, more efficient. But this kind of rebuttal misses 
the point. The subjectivist view is not that external behavior 
cannot be modified, but that the precise costs that must 
be internalized to achieve efficiency cannot be known before 
the fact by the court or other governing body. To reiterate 
O'Driscoll's point, the very concept of "inefficient" behavior 
ex ante is meaningless. It is only after the fact that some 
perceptions can be judged erroneous, and the actions stemming 
from them "inefficient".
The subjectivists reject the 'notion that the courts 
ought to try to engineer wealth maximization. This is not, 
however, to say they reject the ideal that the goods of the 
world ought to be allocated to those who value them, as a
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matter of subjective preference-, the most. As Rizzo points
out, it is really a question of means, not ends:
The central question is this: which
legal framework provides a more stable 
environment for individuals to pursue 
their own ends in harmony with each 
other? Ironically, it is precisely 
because we live in a dynamic world 
where the information needed by the 
"fine-tuners" is not available that 
the answer must be the antiquated ^ d  
static system of strict liability.
As regards the means to achieve value maximization, the 
subjectivists are diametrically opposed to the Posnerian 
approach: while Posner attempts to engineer wealth maximization,
the subjectivists reject the very idea that such engineering 
is possible. It seems that what really is at issue here 
is a problem of valuation, i.e., the problem of determining 
precisely which actions constitute harm and injury. Ultimately 
what counts for the Austrians, and for most Chicago economists 
also, is subjective value. The question, then, is whether 
or not there is any objective measure of subjective value.
The Austrians contend that there is not, while others are willing 
to accept market prices as reasonable measures of value for 
purposes of the law.
Paul Rubin, a theorist in the Chicago tradition, admits
that, given the subjectivist premises, one cannot avoid the
conclusion that "it is impossible to tell if the law is
1 2efficient in any given situation." He sees three options:
(1) reject subjectivism altogether; (2 ) recognize the subjective 
nature of value, but assume "near-efficiency" (i.e., the
"nearness" of market prices to equilibrium and the appropri­
ateness of prices as a measure of value), or (3) accept the 
Austrian position that there can be no objective calculation 
of value. Rubin accepts 2, but it is significant that both 
Rubin and the subjectivists would say the options he enumerates 
are mutually exclusive and exhaust the possibilities. What 
the subjectivists and many Chicago theorists have in common 
is the belief that subjective preference is the ultimate 
basis for normative pronouncements.
It should be stressed that this belief' is itself a value 
judgment. Even if Rubin's assumptions of "near-efficiency" 
are correct, they do not imply that wealth maximization is 
good in the sense that persons ought necessarily to have 
what they prefer. To presume that this is implied is to 
overreach the proper bounds of economic rationality.
C. The Institutionalists
Noted Institutionalist H. H. Liebhafsky begins his critique
of the "new" law and economics with a passage from The Common
Law by Holmes:
The law embodies the story of a 
nation's development through many 
centuries, and it cannot be dealt 
with as if it contained o n l y  the 
axioms and c o r o n a r i e s  of a book 
of mathematics.
"In essence," writes Liebhafsky, "the jurisprudence 
of the Chicago School of economics is nothing other than 
the view of Holmes multiplied by 'minus one'
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These quotations suggest the context in which the Institu­
tionalist critique can best be understood: it is a part
of their larger criticism of the formalistic character of 
Chicago-style microeconomics, particularly the tendency 
to employ the assumptions, axioms and techniques of constrained 
maximization when a more comprehensive approach might be 
appropriate.
It will be helpful, as with the subjectivists above, 
to offer a brief overview of the Institutionalist critique:
1. The Chicago-style economic analysis of law views 
virtually all legal problems in the context of 
constrained maximization: wealth is attained by
maximizing an objective function subject to a 
given set of constraints.
2. But, constrained maximization per se is a tautolo­
gy with regard to the objective function by which 
maximization is reckoned. What is "inefficient" 
by one calculation may be "efficient" when the 
objective function is changed (or assumed to be 
different) or when the opportunities available to 
the indivdual are legally or otherwise altered.
3. The individual, in attempting to reach a maximiz­
ing equilibrium, exercises whatever options are 
available— whatever choices are a part of his 
opportunity set. And it is a larger process of 
mutual coercion, a perpetual power struggle, 
which generates the actual (and changing) struc­
ture of the opportunity set.
4. Therefore, it is methodologically myopic to view 
economic activity in general, and legal problems 
in particular, as a matter of constrained maximi- 
zatio'n, of maximizing some objective function 
subject to a given and fixed set of constraints.
For the Institutionalists the fundamental problem in 
settling most disputes is deciding whose choices and preferences 
should count. Cranking out decisions in the context of 
constrained maximization is almost trivial, for the procedure
presupposes precisely what is at issue. The real question
is always begged: What counts?
The Institutionalists are inarguably correct; the really
crucial decisions in the maximization calculation come prior
to the actual calculation, with the determination of the
objective function by which maximization is reckoned. Thus
Warren Samuels criticizes the economic analysis of law:
Economic analysis of law requires a 
utility (or objective) function. It is 
remarkably easy to manipulate the sub­
stance of the analysis by adopting an 
appropriate objective function to 
produce the conclusion that such and 
such legal action is optimal or sub- 
optimal . . . .  In all cases, the analyst's 
assumption with regard to the objective 
function governs the analytical conclu­
sions on optimality. Constrained 
maximization clearly is propositional: 
it depends on whose objective function 
definition of output^gnd capacity to 
decide are dominant.
Samuels warns against a kind of methodological sleight-
of-hand, and there is at least the hint that he has found
Chicago economists to be disingenuous in their analyses.
Actually, it would be more correct to say that he finds their
analysis presumptive:
It is because of the role of implicit 
normative premises that most, if not 
all optimality reasoning in applied 
economics is presumptive. A verdict 
of efficient or inefficient is a
function of the presumption of some
antecedent rights structure or criterion
of advantage. Efficiency cannot be 
judged without first determining the 
aim of the^ctivity, and this is 
normative.
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Surely it would not be fair to accuse Posner of 
intentional ambiguity about the definition of output, or 
about whose preferences should dominate. He clearly specifies 
wealth as the end-product of economic activity, defines 
wealth as the dollar value of any good or service for which 
persons are willing and able to pay, and identifies the 
dominant preferences as those backed by the most dollars 
or dollar equivalents. The question, then, is whether the 
presumptiveness of the economic analysis of law, and particular­
ly the wealth maximization principle, invalidates the stronger 
claims made for it. In short, is the "new" law and economics 
pretentious?
It is no modest claim to suggest, as Posner has, that
"it may be possible to deduce the basic formal characteris-
18tics of the law itself from economic theory." Liebhafsky
has questioned what it means to say that economics is the
universal logic of the law, pointing out that Posner himself
has been unclear as to which principles and what kind of
law he has in mind. Consider Posner's discussion of
statute law:
If much of the common law seems informed 
by an implicit economic logic, the same 
cannot be said for statute law . . . One
possible explanation for the difference 
in the relative emphasis on efficiency 
and distribution is that the common law 
rules crystallized in the nineteenth 
century, while the statutes . . . are for
the most part products of this century.
The nineteenth century was one of rela­
tively greater scarcity of economic 
resources than today and efficiency may 
be a more highly prized value under
conditions of scarcj^y (at least in 
Western societies).
Regarding this quotation, Liebhafsky points out
that, "Economic efficiency stands here confessed a culturally
determined value . . . [H ]o w , then, can 'economic efficiency'
20be advanced as a basis for a universal rule of law?"
Consider the more specific claim by Posner that the
law "ordains a system of exclusive rights" and then dictates
that they "should be initially vested in those who are
2 1likely to value them the most." The Institutionalists
see a serious problem of circularity in this claim.
Ronald Dworkin has articulated the circularity argument
succinctly:
If economic analysis makes someone's 
initial right . . . depend upon
whether he would purchase the right 
if assigned to another, that right 
cannot be "derived" from economic 
analysis unless we already know who 
initially has the right. This appears 
to be a serious circle. We cannot 
specify an initial assignment of rights 
unless we answer questions that cannot 
be answered unless an initia^2assign_ 
ment of rights is specified.
Samuels makes essentially the same point in the
context of value maximization:
Maximization of the value of output 
requires an antecedent premise as to 
the rights governing that maximization.
Maximization is a function of rights; 
it is circular to assert rights on the 
basis of their money value. The crucial 23 
decision is that of the rights themselves.
In general the Institutionalist objection to the "new” 
law and economics is that it is presumptive and ultimately
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decides nothing. The economic analysis of law, particularly 
the wealth maximization principle, accepts the underlying 
legal and economic structure, then proceeds to generate purely 
redundant "decisions".
C. Concluding Remarks
Both Austrians and Institutionalists reject the "new" 
law and economics, though for different reasons. While the 
Austrians stress subjectivism and the irrelevance of prices, 
the Institutionalists stress the conclusionary nature of 
efficiency analysis. Both critiques support the notion that 
economic rationality is instrumental, not substantive. Both 
deny that economics alone can establish what has value, or 
which actions constitute harm and injury.
Two secondary points deserve brief mention here. It 
was suggested above that the economic analysis of law is 
"partial" in the sense that its conclusions are particular 
to the underlying distribution of wealth. Posner has tried 
to demonstrate, via his theory of the "natural owner" that 
the wealth maximization principle itself establishes the 
crucial initial distribution. If the Institutionalists are 
correct, however, Posner's reasoning is circular, and his 
attempt to complete the analysis in this way has failed.
A second point mentioned above is that an economic analysis 
which proceeds entirely on the basis of monetary prices would be 
incomplete because many real costs and benefits never find 
monetary expression, though they do influence choice behavior. 
The Austrians would certainly agree with this contention.
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The unresolved question, still, is where to draw the line 
on objective data. The Austrians are unwilling even to assume 
near-efficiency, yet one must accept the notion of near­
efficiency in order to say much about the law from an economic 
perspective. In order to do even a partial analysis one 
must often assume that prices reflect preferences, and that 
preferences and tastes are relatively stable. Otherwise, 
we cannot even begin to speak of supply and demand curves.
This dissertation will not attempt to establish where, 
precisely, to draw the line. Chapter V will', however, discuss 
the limitations imposed by a subjectivist view of cost and 
benefit and will conclude that even if "near-efficiency" 
is assumed for the sake of analysis, the limitations are 
more severe than most economists, including those in the 
Chicago tradition, have recognized.
The critiques put forth by the Austrians and Institutional­
ists are essentially concerned with economic theory rather 
than morals and ethics. The following chapter will review 
the legal theorists, who, unlike the economists, consider 
primarily Posner's contention that wealth maximization generates 
the substantive moral foundation for a complete theory of 
law.
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IV. The Legal Theorists
A . Introduction
The Austrians and Institutionalists put forth critiques 
of law and economics that are, for the most part, technical 
and economic as distinguished from ideological and philo­
sophical. Both groups stand within the science of economics 
and their critiques mainly concern the nature and integrity 
of economic theory. The present chapter reviews a fundamentally 
different kind of critique. This critique may be described 
as philosophical, ethical, or perhaps jurisprudential-- 
generally it is not concerned with the technical aspects 
of economics per s e . It is put forth most forcefully, though 
not singularly, by legal theorists who focus primarily on 
moral and ethical, not technical aspects of the economic 
analysis of law.
This chapter reviews the more important critiques put 
forth by those legal theorists who reject the "new" law and 
economics in part or in whole. The purpose is primarily 
to determine whether the economic analysis, particularly 
the principle of wealth maximization, consistently generates 
for itself the normative principles that are necessary if 
it is to stand as a complete analysis of law. In addition 
to examining the consistency and completness of the economic
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analysis, the review will consider whether it yields precepts 
sharply contrary to widely recognized moral and ethical maxims 
precepts such as that muder is good, or that producing halluc­
inogenic drugs is of the same moral status as producing polio 
vaccine.
The review begins with those who discuss wealth maximiza­
tion from the perspectives of two widely accepted ethical 
systems: Kantianism and Utilitarianism.
B. Kantianism and Utilitarianism
One widely accepted theory of social justice, drawing 
upon the thought of Kant, Rousseau and more recently John 
Rawls, holds that social obligation, the obligation to obey 
society's ground-rules, can only be justified to the extent 
that a rational and free person would be expected to accept 
those rules. Obligations to which a rational person would 
not consent (under certain conditions precluding narrow self- 
interest) are not just. This is generally what is meant 
by the Kantian principle of consent.
With this principle of consent there are concomitant 
rights. Each person is to be treated as an autonomous being, 
and allowed the freedom to pursue his chosen goals— to follow 
his own "life plan"--subject to the principle of reciprocity: 
the exercise of one's rights is not to infringe upon another's 
identical rights.
It will be recalled from the previous review of Posner 
that he contends his wealth maximization principle embodies
a principle of consent that is essentially Kantian, though
not identical to the Rawlsian formulation. It is reasonable,
Posner argues, when explicit, expressed consent does not
exist, for the court to look for implied consent, as by trying
to answer the hypothetical question of whether, if transactions
costs were zero, the affected parties would consent to (or
purchase) a given state of affairs.^
There is an obvious similarity between Posner's approach
and that of Rawls, which places a free and rational person
behind the "veil of ignorance" and then asks whether or not
that person would consent to this or that social arrangement.
There is, however, a crucial difference. A person in Rawls'
"original position" is assumed to be "artificially," to use
Posner’s terminology, ignorant. That is, no person knows
the nature of his particular circumstances, or the details
of his personal plan of life, or even the generation in history
to which he belongs. Posner places one not in this position
of "artificial" ignorance, but what he terms "natural" ignorance
In [Rawls'] original position, no one 
knows whether he has productive 
capabilities . . . This result obscures
the important moral distinction, 
between the capacity to enjoy and the 
capacity to produce for others that 
distinguishes utility from wealth. I 
prefer, therefore, to imagine actual 
people displaying actual endowments of 
skill and energy under uncertainty. I 
prefer that is, to imagine choice under 
conditions of natural ignorance to 
choice under the artificial ignorance 
of the original position.
Thus, Posner's alternative theory proceeds from a modified 
original position. It is, according to some critics, a fatally 
wrong starting point for a theory that claims to embody any­
thing close to Kantian consent. Probably the most extensive
treatment of this aspect of Posner's approach comes from 
3Ronald Dworkin. According to Dworkin, the moral significance
of the veil of ignorance is that it imposes a "deep equality"
among persons:
Indeed Rawls' original position is a 
powerful mechanism for thinking abo^t 
justice because the design of that 
position embodies and enforces the 
theory of deep equality . . .  It embodies 
that theory precisely through the 
stipulation that parties consent to 
principles o,f justice with no knowledge 
of any qualifities or attributes that 
give them advantages over others, and with 
no knowledge of what concepts of the ^ 
good they hold as distinct from others.
Rawls did not arbitrarily specify the degree of ignorance. 
His original position was carefully constructed to preclude 
choice made in light of the particular results in concrete 
society. Dworkin's criticism of Posner's "natural" ignorance 
is precisely that its specification is wholly dependent upon 
the particular results that Posner already has in mind.
Dworkin makes his point with the example of strict liability 
as an alternative to negligence rules for automobile accidents. 
Posner has argued that a negligence approach to automobile 
accidents (in which one party would receive monetary compensation 
only if the other party is clearly at fault) is not only 
cheaper than a strict liability approach in terms of insurance
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premiums, but also that it embodies the principle of consent. 
The latter point is somewhat surprising; in what sense may 
a driver injured by another driver in an accident in which 
neither was at fault be said to have consented to the 
accident? Posner points out that insurance premiums are 
lower under the negligence system, then contends that the 
lower insurance costs constitute a kind of ex ante compen­
sation. By accepting the reduction in insurance costs persons 
are consenting, in effect, to accidents:
The notion of consent used here is 
what economists call ex ante compensa­
tion. I contend, I hope uncontrover- 
sially, that if you buy a lottery 
ticket and lose the lottery, then, so 
long as there is no question of fraud 
or duress, you have consented to the 
loss . . . Suppose some entrepreneur
loses money because a competitor 
develops a superior product. Since 
the return to entrepreneurial activity 
will include a premium to cover the 
risk of losses due to competition, the 
entrepreneur is^compensated for those 
losses ex an t e .
Dworkin argues, however, that in this and other cases
the degree of ignorance seems to depend upon the results
one desires:
For any particular plaintiff, he 
(Ponser) wants to invite consent at 
some time after the person's driving 
habits are sufficiently well formed 
so that he is a gainer from reduced 
driving costs, but before the time he 
has suffered an uninsured accident.
What time is that? Why is that time 
decisive? Rawls chose his original 
position, with its radical ignorance, 
for reasons of political morality . . .
Posner seems able to define his 
conditions of counter factual choice 
only s(j as to reach the results he 
wants.
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Dworkin is essentially correct. Posner begins by identi­
fying the less costly approach, then argues that this approach 
can be reconciled with a notion of consent under particular 
conditions of uncertainty and ignorance. This hardly 
demonstrates that a universal principle of consent is derived 
from wealth maximization. And only a universal concept 
can serve consistently as a normative guide for policy 
makers in a variety of different cases involving considerations 
of consent.
Several critics of the economic analysis of law, including
g
Coleman, Baker, Kronman, Michelman and Markovits have argued 
that wealth maximization is not truly Kantian precisely 
because it is identical to the Kaldor-Hicks criterion, a 
measure of aggregate welfare which is unconstrained by the 
Pareto injunction that no party should be made worse off if 
a change is to be considered efficient.
Since Posner himself has equated wealth maximization
9with the Kaldor-Hicks criterion, a brief digression on 
it is warranted. The Kaldor-Hicks principle may be stated 
as follows: If individual A is made so much better by
some change or event that he could compensate B for the 
loss inflicted upon him by that change, and still have 
something left over, then the change or event represents 
an unequivocal improvement.
Since actual compensation need not be paid, the principle
of consent seems to be absent. Commenting on the Kaldor-
Hicks criterion, Frank Michelman points out that it
. . . requires only hypothetical
willingness to pay and accept; it
does not require actual payment.
Thus the result of an "efficient" 
change may well be benefit to syge 
at the expense of others . . .
He goes on to state that
. . . the most basic obligational value
is respect for the capacity of the 
individual to formulate and act ^
according to his or her own life plan.
Kaldor-Hicks interventions produce losers, so why 
would a loser consent to such interventions?, Posner says 
that in many cases the losers can be said to have consented 
to the loss by accepted e_x ante compensation, as in the 
accident liability example discussed above. The point 
was made by Dworkin that Posner's description of the circum­
stances under which consent is invited is somewhat arbitrary.
A second, and perhaps more fundamental point is made by
Coleman, who argues that accepting compensation (whether 
ex ante or ex post) is not the equivalent of granting consent
Even if it made sense to say that 
everyone under the fault [negligence] 
system accepted the lower costs, it 
would hardly follow that by accepting 
the reduced costs the actual victims 
had consented to the loss . . . Compen­
sation enforces my right to security; 
it is not the instrument through 
which I express my consent to havj^g 
the level of my security reduced.
While Dworkin argues the fundamental point that wealth 
maximization does not embody the true Kantian principle 
of consent, others have argued more specifically that wealth 
maximization can lead to results which are inconsistent 
with the principles of autonomy and individual freedom.
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Lewis Kornhauser, for instance, argues that wealth maximization
justifies coercing people who abhor certain activities
into undertaking them if they are more productive in the
undesired activities than the ones in which they would
13choose to engage. He contends that wealth maximization
might even dictate "a good deal of wholesale slaughter:"^
All those who are unproductive, who 
cost more than they produce, must go.
In particular, wealth maximization 
requires that we destroy the mentally 
retarded and the mentally ill who are 
institutionalized.
Kornhauser goes on to mention other "groups subject 
to extinction", including welfare mothers and retardates 
with no source of income. Posner has an escape route, 
however, to get away from such unappealing conclusions:
The indolent, the retarded, the sick and the old could be 
"saved"; indeed, they would be supported as a matter of wealth 
maximization, lf_ they were, in Posner's words, "part of 
the utility function of someone who has w e a l t h . " ^  However, 
to argue that the "nonproductive" might be supported under 
a system of wealth maximization is a far cry from deriving 
the principles of autonomy and human rights from that system.
Generally, the same kind of argument is made by Frank 
Michelman.^^ To demonstrate his point, Michelman considers 
a strict liability case. Suppose an accident has occurred 
in a rental housing unit, and it appears that the contribu­
tory activity of the landlord consisted of conduct that 
violates a public standard of right behavior. The question
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ought to be strictly liable. He argues that strict liability 
ought to be enforced because it reflects the "purpose of 
protecting a certain class of citizens against a certain 
class of hazards— hazards against which the protected class 
is believed otherwise relatively defenseless by reason 
of limited market p o w e r . " ^
Perhaps the assumption that landlords and tenants
fall perfectly into the categories of economically powerful
and economically defenseless, respectively, is dubious.
At any rate, such a situation would imply very non-competitive
market conditions in the housing industry, so it is important
to note that Michelman ultimately rests his conclusions
on the principle that all persons are to be treated as
ends in themselves. He contends that in this case . . .
[t]he preeconomic demand for respect 
for each individual's personal integrity 
and humanity— the Kantian injunction to 
treat each person as a means— get^g 
secondary, if any, consideration.
Another statement by Michelman seems to be grounded in
the same principle:
[T]he solution to the question of 
corrective justice is not thought to 
depend or partake of the private,
subjective values of any individual . . .
The solution, rather, reflects a public 
value of fair dealing and right relations 
between fellow members of a society en­
countering one anothe-r under circum- 
stances„in which they must share a common 
burden.
Unfortunately, Michelman is not clear as to what the
specific "burdens" might be or how they ought to be "shared".
(Does strict liability constitute "sharing"?)
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What can be said in conclusion about Kantianism and the
economic analysis of law? First, the connection between wealth
maximization and the concept of consent seems quite tenuous.
Second, Posner's claim that "the commitment of the economic
approach to the principle of exclusive rights is much stronger
21than that of . . . many Kantians" is dubious at best. While
certain particular rights are implied by wealth maximization, 
that principle also implies the violation of such fundamental 
rights as to choose one's profession, and perhaps even the 
right of an individual to his or her own life'. Thus it seems 
reasonable to conclude that the economic approach, particularly 
wealth maximization, has not been shown to give rise to a 
consistent set of principles in cases involving considerations 
of consent, rights, or the autonomy of the individual. Further­
more, in some cases where normative principles are implied, 
those principles are contrary to widely recognized moral and 
ethical norms.
Utilitarianism, as it is ordinarily understood, and as 
22Posner uses the term , holds that the moral value of an action 
(or an institution, law, etc.) lies in its effects in promoting 
happiness. Happiness in this context means the surplus of 
pleasure over pain, and while it is usually restricted to 
human happiness, some versions of utilitarianism include all 
sentient beings.
There are actually two kinds of utilitarianism —  two 
"ways of being a utilitarian", as Ronald Dworkin put it.
One way is to hold that happiness is good in itself, so the
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more of it the better, regardless of its distribution. The 
other is to hold that distributional considerations are important, 
so goods ought to be distributed so as to maximize the average 
happiness over some stipulated population. The latter may 
be called "egalitarian" utilitarianism and the former "teleo- 
logical" utilitarianism.
Among the severest critics of economic theory are those
who equate it with philosophical utilitarianism, then attack
utilitarianism. Writing in the Georgia Law Review, H. L.
A. Hart uses this tack. He claims that Posner acknowledges
utilitarianism to be the inspiration of the economic analysis 
23of the law; it is, however, a false charge. Posner has 
shown that wealth maximization is not utilitarianism, and 
goes on to argue that wealth maximization is a superior basis 
for a normative theory of law.
In his most thorough treatment of the relationship between
24economic theory and utiliarianism, Posner draws the crucial 
distinction between the economic principle of wealth, and 
welfare. i.e., happiness in the utilitarian sense. Wealth
discriminates among preferences on the basis of willingness 
and ability to pay, while the felicific calculas of utilitar­
ianism must include any and all preferences within the 
relevant population. Only those preferences manifested in 
demand functions count as wealth:
Wealth is the value in dollars or dollar 
equivalents (an important qualification, 
as we shall see), of everything in 
society . . . The only kind of preference
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that counts in a system of wealth 
maximization is thus one backed up by 
money— in other words, g^e that is 
registered in a market.
The market need not be an explicit one, however, Posner
discusses the concept of "hypothetical markets", it will
be recalled, in which the court must mimic the market when
transactions costs preclude actual market transactions.
In such cases the operative principle is still wealth
maximization, though information costs would inevitably bring
a degree of uncertainty to the court's calculation.
Posner uses the following example to demonstrate that
maximizing wealth is not the same thing as maximizing
2 6utilitarian happiness : Suppose a polluting factory causes
residential property values to fall by $2 million, but it
would cost the company $3 million to eliminate the pollution.
Wealth maximization requires the residents to bear the costs,
irrespective of considerations of happiness. Reverse the
numbers and you reverse the wealth-maximizing decision.
In discussing the problems with utilitarianism, Posner
begins with the so-called boundary problem: Whose preferences
are to count in designing policies to maximize happiness?
Where is one to draw the line? Posner argues that in the
wealth maximization approach the boundary problem is much
less acute, for it specifies quite clearly that those preferences
which count are only those backed by willingness and ability 
27to pay.
Closely related to the boundary problem is what Posner
calls "the perils of instrumentalism". What he is referring
to is the "moral monstrousness" of utilitarianism: The
willingness of utilitarianism to "sacrifice the innocent
2 8individual on the altar of social needs", and its failure
to distinguish among different types of pleasure. As an
example of the first kind of monstrousness, Posner cites
the possibility that a strict utilitarian would condone the
killing of old, unhappy grandfathers whose riddance would
relieve his children of his mischief, as well as grant them
their inheritances. "I believe," Posner writes, "that a
consistent utilitarian would have to reckon the murderer
a good man . . . Yet to call the murderer . . .  a 'good man'
29does unacceptable violence to conventional moral notions."
Regarding the utilitarian's refusal to distinguish
among the different kinds of pleasure, Posner contrasts the
pleasure of feeding pigeons with that of pulling the wings
off flies. He finds it morally unacceptable to favor the
latter activity, though the utilitarian might not be able
30to escape that result. Posner finds the perils of
instrumentalism much less acute with wealth maximization,
because the wealth maximizer confines lawful coercion to
a much more restricted domain than does the utilitarian.
The sole basis for coercion in the wealth approach is "a
failure of the market to operate that is so serious that
the wealth of a society can be increased by public coercion, 
31iself costly." While Posner acknowledges the difficulty 
in recognizing market failures as well as the cost of
correcting them, he contends that "at least these are
32empirical rather than value questions." What Posner means
by market failure is apparently restricted to transactions
costs:
Some libertarians worry that the 
economist will exploit the measurement 
problems inherent in the use of a 
hypothetical market criterion to 
impose all sorts of duties on people 
in the name of efficiency. But, to
repeat, the imposition of duties is
appropriate in the economic view only in
the exceptional case where market trans­
action costs are prohibitive. Epstein 
is incorrect in suggesting that the 
wealth-maximization principle would 
entail forcing a surgeon to travel 
across India if he were the only 
physician who could save some individual.
This is not a case of high transaction 
costs. If the individual can meet the 
surgeon's price, the surgeon will travel 
to treat him, and if not, the surgeon 
will m a x i m i z e ^ h e  social wealth by 
staying home.
Another serious problem with utilitarianism is the
dilemma of whether to maximize average or total utility.
According to Posner there is no clear basis in utilitarian
theory for choosing between average and total happiness,
though the latter, he claims without elaboration, is more
consistent with the "simple insistence of utility as the 
3 ̂maximand." In a system of wealth maximization, the
average - total conflict would not arise, Posner argues, i_f
all external effects were accurately taken into account.
He uses immigration as an example:
The average wealth of the existing 
population is bound to increase as a 
result of immigration so long as any
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potential negative externalities of 
immigration are fully internalized to 
the immigrants. And conflict between 
maximizing the wealth of a nation and 
the world will also be rare, because 
most trade restrictions hurt both 
parties to them.
Finally, there is the problem of measurement. While
utility or happiness cannot be measured, dollars, of course,
can. With wealth maximization that is, however, a measurement
problem when the market is hypothetical. Posner argues that
it is nonetheless easier to measure wealth in such cases
than happiness:
For example, the right of the physician 
who treats an unconscious accident 
victim later to claim his regular fee 
from the victim is founded on the 
reasonable assumption that if the 
victim could have negotiated with the 
physician for such service at such price, 
he would have done so . . .  It is much 
easier to guess peoples' market prefer­
ences . . . than to guess what p o l i c e s
will maximize subjective happiness.
In summary, Posner has considered what he feels are 
the main problems with regard to utilitarianism, and in each 
instance finds wealth maximization to be a preferable ethical 
criterion. It will come as no surprise that the critics 
of law and economics take exception on many points.
Perhaps it would be useful first to review the points
of agreement between Posner and his critics. There is general
agreement that wealth maximization is not philosophical
utilitarianism. Actually, Richard Markovits made this point
37even before Posner, but most of the discussion has come . 
in the wake of Posner's "Utilitarianism, Economics, and 
Legal Theory". In addition to Markovits, Coleman, Kronman
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and Kornhauser have written at some length on the relation-
3 8ship between wealth maximization and utilitarianism, and
each has concluded that they are, as Posner maintains, competing
theories, not different versions of the same theory.
The point that allocations on the basis of wealth maxi­
mization can differ from those made on utility considerations
was neatly demonstrated by Anthony Kronman in his "wall"
39example, which can be summarized as follows: Suppose A
and B are on opposite sides of a high wall and cannot 
communicate with one another. B has a book which he is willing 
to sell for $2; A would be willing to pay $4 for it, though 
he is unaware of B's existence. There is a third person,
C, who is able to effect a transfer of the book and/or the 
money, though without bringing the two parties into communi­
cation with one another. He has several options. Wealth 
maximization demands that the book be transferred to A, but 
in Kronman's particular example, does not necessarily require 
a transfer of money. Thus wealth maximization leaves the 
question of payment unanswered. On the other hand, a considera­
tion of utility (i.e., happiness) unambiguously requires, 
in this example, a transfer of the book and no transfer of 
money. Utilitarianism is thus, shown, correctly, to be 
distinct from wealth maximization.
In this example utilitarianism is shown also to be 
superior by virtue of its ability to determine solutions 
when wealth considerations cannot. Kronman reaches this 
conclusion through arbitrarily assigning utility values to
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40various possible solutions, and therein lies a serious fallacy. 
The analysis is constructed from the beginning to favor utili­
tarianism. It could, however, have been similarly "rigged" 
to generate the result that utilitarianism is indeterminate.
Jules Coleman goes more deeply than Kronman into the 
meanings of various efficiency criteria and their relation­
ships to utilitarianism. He considers Pareto superiority,
Pareto optimality and Kaldor-Hicks, and finds in each case 
that any connection with utilitarianism is invalid because
that would require a standard of comparability of utility
41which does not exist.
His discussion of Kaldor-Hicks is the most relevant,
since wealth maximization is generally accepted to be a monetary
expression of Kaldor-Hicks. There are two problems with
Kaldor-Hicks which preclude its transformation into an index
of utility, he points out. First, in order to infer from
satisfaction of the Kaldor-Hicks test that there has been
a net gain in utility, one needs to know that the winners
have gained more than the losers have lost. In the absence of
actual, voluntarily accepted compensation this requires an
impossible interpersonal comparison of total utility. Second,
the Kaldor-Hicks test can lead to the paradox that two states
of affairs may be Kaldor-Hicks efficient to one another.
This is the well-known Scitovsky Paradox. Thus Kaldor-Hicks
efficiency is paradoxical as a standard of utility and could
not be transformed into a utility index even if interpersonal
utility comparisons were possible.
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The most direct attack on "Utilitarianism, Economics,
^ 2
and Legal Theory" comes from Lewis Kornhauser. He accepts 
Posner's analysis of the problems with utilitarianism, but 
challenges his contention that the difficulties are "less 
acute", or even non-existent, with wealth maximization. 
Concerning the boundary problem, Kornhauser aruges that in 
the wealth approach, precisely the same questions are left 
unanswered as in the utilitarian approach. While he speaks 
specifically of "time horizons", and "global" as opposed 
to "local" solutions, his general point is that the necessity 
of drawing the boundaries before proceeding with one's calcu­
lation is every bit as real with wealth maximization as 
utilitarianism. For example, he aruges, with regard to the
potential wealth of unborn persons, that including such wealth, 
43as Posner does, in the calculation
. . . rests on the same grounds as a
decision to include them in an utili­
tarian calculus; those considerations 
recommend maximizing wealth or other 
concepts of utility over a long tiijig- 
horizon as opposed to a short one.
And with regard to foreign populations, Kornhauser
points out that
To maximize global wealth, it may, 
therefore, be necessary to enact or 
enforce laws in the United S t a t e s ^  
that do not maximize wealth here.
There is every reason, Kornhauser maintains, for the
4 6total-average conflict to arise also with wealth maximization.
He offers a couple of examples. First, he thinks it reasonable 
that maximizing total wealth might require making some people
poor. Second, he suggests it might be possible for the highest 
average wealth to be attained when the population is relatively 
small, while the highest total wealth might occur with a 
very large population, all of whose members are living at or 
close to subsistence.
When all externalities are considered, as in the analysis 
Posner offers above, it is certainly impossible for total 
wealth not to be increased, for any action which increases 
net wealth at the margin must increase total wealth. However, 
an increase in the total does not necessarily mean an increase 
in the average. By focusing on wealth at the margin, Posner 
arbitrarily eliminates consideration of average wealth from 
the beginning. One could, of course, make the same prejudgment 
about happiness maximization, then proceed to argue that 
when all external effects are considered, there is "no conflict" 
between average and total happiness. The relevant question 
remains: What is the basis for choosing total above average
as the maximand?
Kornhauser hits hard on the issue of moral monstrous­
ness, arguing that wealth maximization (a) uses persons as 
instruments in the pursuit of social wealth, hence could 
coerce them into undesired activities; (b) makes no moral 
distinction between the different preferences that give 
rise to effective demand; and (c) is willing to sacrifice 
the innocent for the good (i.e., wealth) of society as a 
whole.
Points (a) and (c) are closely related, and Kornhauser's
discussion of them was sufficiently covered above in the
discussion of wealth maximization and human rights. His
discussion of the moral distinction between the different
preferences which give rise to willingness and ability to
pay (or simply "effective demand") is also illuminating.
He argues that wealth maximization would theoretically honor
those who produce heroin the same as those who produce penicillin,
thus making no distinction between "perverse desires and
noble o n e s . " ^  But Posner never absolutely denies this result.
Rather, he points out that the person with perverse preferences
must also be a productive member of society if he is to have
48the wealth necessary to make his preferences felt. , Posner's 
response altogether misses the point, for in the wealth 
maximization scheme producing heroin is by definition being 
a productive member of society as long as some prefer heroin 
and are willing and able to pay to get it. It is precisely 
the point that wealth maximization fails to distinguish among 
the different preferences giving rise to effective demand.
What can be said in summation about the relationship 
between wealth maximization and utilitarianism? First, wealth 
is distinct from happiness in the utilitarian sense, hence 
wealth maximization should not be equated with utilitarianism.
Nor does a wealth approach necessarily lead to results that 
are consistent with utilitarianism. The discussion also 
seems to support two previous conclusions: wealth maximi­
zation has not been shown to yield a consistent or complete
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set of normative principles, and it can lead to results that 
are sharply contrary to accepted moral and ethical norms.
The literature reviewed above is concerned with comparing 
wealth maximization to utilitarianism, and before that, to 
Kantianism. Several critics have discussed wealth maximi­
zation without special reference to Kantian or utilitarian 
considerations, and it is appropriate that they be reviewed 
before a final assessment of wealth maximization as an ethical 
system is m a d e .
C. Other Ethical and Moral Considerations
Without adopting specifically a Kantian or utilitarian
49position, Ronald Dworkin discusses whether wealth ought 
to be considered a worthy social goal, either as a component 
of value or as an instrument of value. He rejects both possi­
bilities .
Dworkin feels that wealth is not a component of value 
because it makes no sense to speak of a trade-off between 
wealth and justice. He considers choosing among hypotheti­
cal societies by trading off justice against wealth, and 
concludes that if one were to choose the morally best society, 
all things considered, then "the very idea of a trade-off 
between justice and wealth now becomes mysterious. If the 
individual is to choose the morally best society, why should 
not its justice alone m a t t e r ? " ^
Here Dworkin is objecting to t h o s e ^  who suggest that 
political decisions sometimes must be made between justice
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on the one hand, and efficiency on the other. In this context, 
Dworkin is correct: there is no reason, from a moral point
of view, to choose less justice. However, when the argument 
is applied to the contention that wealth is a component of 
value, it becomes more semantical than substantive. Dworkin 
implicitly defines justice as that set of principles which 
is morally preferable; thus, he begs the question whether 
wealth should be included in that set.
The instrumental claim for wealth maximization is not 
that it is a component of justice, but that it promot'es justice. 
Dworkin points out that the instrumental claim must be accom­
panied by some specification of the values or goals--the 
"true ends" as he calls them--which are supposedly advanced 
through wealth maximization. He laments the fact that there 
have been few attempts by law economists to do this, though 
he offers no specification either. But the heart of his 
critique of the instrumentalist claim seems to be the empirical 
question of whether wealth maximization would in fact lead 
to the desired "true ends":
My point is not that it is impossible 
antecedently to descri be the "best" 
mix of components, other than the I- 
know-it-when-I-see-it-fashion--although 
that is a bad sign. But rather that at 
the level of fine tuning necessary'to 
distinguish the results of wealth maxi­
mization from the results of compromises, 
there simply is_ no one "best" mix ante­
cedently more likely to be produced by 
one rather the other of these social
techniques.
His subsequent discussion of certain suggested "true
ends" is worth a brief review. Concerning the proposition
that wealth maximization would produce more "beneficial-for-
others activity" than a society pursuing a more direct altruism
Dworkin stresses that the moral content of an act lies in
the intentions of the actor:
For the moral value of beneficial 
activity, considered in itself, 
consists in the will or intentions 
of the actor . . . Posner makes
plain that his production-for-others 
claim has nothing to do with the other- 
regarding intentions of actors in the 
economic process . . . Any benefit
to others comes f r o ^ t h e  invisible 
hand not good will.
Dworkin also considers the meritocratic theory, which
holds that justice consists in that distribution which rewards
persons in accordance with their merits. He argues that
. . . since which talents are rewarded
by the market is highly contingent on 
a variety of factors, the pursuit of 
efficiency cannot be relied on to 
reward any particular set of ^ e s e  as 
independent merits over time.
For instance, he wonders whether the market could always 
be relied upon to reward "that set of talents necessary consist 
ently to hit a breaking p i t c h . I t  is probably true that 
Joe Dimaggio would not have been so well rewarded in a society 
that did not enjoy baseball, but this would seem to be a 
matter of particular job skills, not merit. One could argue 
that such "independent" attributes as industry, shrewdness, 
courage, and self-sacrifice, which are rewarded on the athletic 
field, are equally important in many other departments of life.
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Dworkin does briefly consider such "relatively fixed" attributes,
as he calls them, and admits that they are rewarded by the
5 6market "typically, although not inevitably."
The ethical position which may be very generally termed 
"egalitarianism" has been the basis for some criticism of 
the economic analysis of law. Utility considerations often 
serve to justify egalitarian policies, though other justifications 
exist, and will be touched on below. Lucian Bebchuk's"^ 
critique is an example of the utility approach. He begins 
with the proposition that the ’marginal utility of income 
is likely to be relatively less for the wealthy than for 
the poor. Thus, the wealthy may not only be better able 
than the poor to get what they want on the basis of ability 
to pay, but to get it at a lower cost in utility.
5 8Another critic who takes a similar tack is Edwin Baker.
He acknowledges, however, that it is impossible to be certain
about interpersonal comparisons of the utility of money,
59and following Abba Lerner postulates a random distribution 
of the second-derivative values for the utility of money 
functions. Given this assumption, it follows that an equal 
distribution of income would maximize the utility of money.
Baker's point is the same as Bebchuk's, namely that in a 
world of unequal incomes, the rich are favored, in utility 
terms, by wealth maximization.
A related point made by Baker, Bebchuk and others is 
that the rich are favored outright since the ability to pay 
is so crucial in the definition of wealth. In fairness to
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Posner, it should be mentioned that this kind of objection 
tends to confuse ability to pay with willingness, or at 
least fail to recognize the importance of the latter. What 
a relatively less wealthy person wishes to have might happen 
not to.be what a wealthy person also wants. Ability to pay 
is only a part of the criterion of wealth.
Baker also argues that wealth maximization is likely 
to favor the rich because they are the more productive, and 
wealth maximization favors the more productive. Baker establishes 
the crucial link between the rich and the productive in two 
ways. The first is really only a play on words, for he ident­
ifies the rich as those who "own a disproportionate share 
of the productive a s s e t s . " ^  The other way he links the 
rich and the productive is to suggest that
. . . if a party's gain of a claimed
right in a previous case had the 
effect of making his productive 
resources (e.g. labor) more valuable 
to him, then a right not to have his 
productive resource interfered with 
or damaged would be valuable g<j> him 
because of the previous gain.
The efficiency of capital markets might be relevant here, 
since much of the advantage of previous gains is lost if 
capital markets allow one to borrow against future earnings.
Still, Baker's general contention that the productive are 
favored over the nonproductive is correct. The point is 
repeatedly stressed, however, by Posner himself. He considers 
productivity a virtue, not a vice, and argues precisely that 
the productive ought to be favored over the nonproductive.
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6 2Bechuk argues that the distinction between producers
and nonproducers is inconsequential. His argument is that
the producers' prices depend upon the consumers' monetary
valuations which in turn depend upon their wealth. "To that
extent," he concludes, "assigning the entitlement to the
producer is indeed granting it to the customers' consumptive 
6 3activity." His point is certainly not inconsistent with 
the neoclassical view of the firm as a coordinating entity, 
reconciling the plans and purposes of resource suppliers 
on the one hand with those of consumers on the other. He 
might have gone on, however, to say that consumers' wealth 
depends ultimately and in the long run upon their productivity.
The point remains that wealth maximization does reward production, 
in Posner's view a strength, not a weakness of his proposed 
system.
A few words of summary are in order. This chapter has 
reviewed the more important ethical and moral critiques of 
wealth maximization. The general conclusion is that Posner 
has failed to demonstrate that a consistent and complete 
set of normative principles can be derived from the economic 
analysis of law. Moreover, it seems that wealth maximization 
can in fact lead to practices that are sharply contrary to 
accepted ethical and moral norms.
These conclusions support the central thesis of this 
dissertation, that economics is not useful in matters of 
substantive rationality. The crucial questions regarding 
what constitutes harm and injury are not satisfactorily
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answered by economics alone.
The purpose of this chapter has not been to develop 
a particular definition of harm and injury, but merely to 
argue that economics fails to do so for essentially two reasons. 
First, the economic approach does not consistently serve 
either Kantian or utilitarian principles; second, it contravenes 
certain widely held maxims, and can lead, in fact, to conclusions 
that are morally abhorrent. Some will object to this conclusion 
on the basis that no coherent system of morality has been 
developed in this dissertation in order that an action can 
be judged morally abhorrent. Only the following defehse, 
if it can be called that, is offered; It is simply obvious 
to the conscience that such things as murdering the retarded 
because they cannot purchase the right to life, or selling 
illegal narcotics to children, or even torturing dumb animals 
are morally wrong and involve more harm than good. Some 
actions do constitute harm and injury, and this is true regard­
less of "how one talks about it", to borrow a phrase from 
Professor Arthur Leff. It is only hoped that the sophistication 
of the reader is not terribly offended by such a position 
as this.
E. Some Concluding Remarks on the Completeness of the "New"
Law and Economics
Both Chapters III and IV have been concerned with those 
who are critical of the economic analysis of law. In light 
of the critiques reviewed in these chapters, it is now possible
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to assess more fully the completeness of the "new" law and 
economics, especially Posner's efforts to construct a complete 
theory on the basis of wealth maximization.
Chapter II suggested three important criteria that must 
be met if the economic analysis were to give rise to a complete 
theory of law. First, the economic analysis must not depend 
upon prior or exogenous determination of the distribution 
of wealth and income. In other words, it must be able to 
determine endogenously, or "for itself", the initial distribu­
tion of wealth and income. Second, the economic analysis 
must not proceed entirely in terms of some particular concept 
of value (e.g., income or market price) without reference 
to "utility" or "human satisfaction" since the latter are 
considered in modern microeconomics to be the ultimate motivation 
in all "choice" behavior. Finally, and most importantly, 
the economic analysis must not rely upon external moral consid­
erations'. It must be able to generate for itself the necessary 
"value judgments" regarding the ends the law is supposed 
to pursue. It must, in other words, involve substantive 
as well as instrumental rationality.
Concerning the first criterion, Chapter III presented 
the Institutionalist critique which rejects the wealth maximiza­
tion approach, stressing that willingness and ability to 
pay are a function of the distribution of income and wealth: 
alter the distribution of income and wealth, and you alter 
the structure of demand. Hence, the wealth-maximizing allo­
cation of economic goods is particular to the initial
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distribution of income and wealth. Posner denies this conclu­
sion and argues that the wealth maximization principle itself 
establishes the initial ("natural") distribution. But if 
the Institutionalists' so-called circularity argument is 
correct, and it would appear to be, then Posner's reasoning 
must be rejected.
With regard to the second criterion, the discussion 
of Coase in Chapter II pointed out, among other things, that 
if one speaks of "wealth" in the narrow context of market 
prices, this notion of wealth is quite divorced from the 
general concept of utility, or what Posner himself terms 
"human satisfaction". The Austrian critique argues in essence 
that one cannot claim, as even the early Posner does, to 
be able to say very much about "human satisfaction" if one 
is constrained to speak in terms of prices. Further, the 
discussion in Chapter III suggested that the completely 
generalized concept of utility is appropriate, even necessary, 
for developing even descriptive analysis of behavior in the 
choice-theoretic framework, since relevant costs and benefits 
often fail to be expressed monetarily.
The third criterion has received more attention than 
the others in this study. Chapter II discussed the view, 
expressed by numerous economists including the early Posner, 
that efficiency can be a goal independently of other goals, 
particularly "morality" goals such as equality, rights, utility, 
etc. It was argued, however, that in studies such as Becker's 
analysis of crime, the derivation of efficiency or optimality
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conditions depends upon prior assumptions of certain moral 
principles .
The necessity for moral and ethical principles would 
not render the economic analysis a partial or incomplete 
analysis if wealth maximization could generate for itself 
the requisite principles. The need for principles concerning 
human rights, for instance, would not require that we look 
beyond economics if economics could itself generate a theory 
of rights. That it can, in terms of wealth maximization, 
is precisely the argument advanced in some of Posner's more 
recent writings.
Whether wealth maximization does in fact imply either 
utility or rights goals is questioned by several critics 
whose arguments are reviewed in Chapter IV, and it was concluded 
that while exclusive rights are in many cases a means to 
wealth, rights goals are not necessarily derived from the 
principle of wealth maximization. Much the same was said 
about wealth maximization and utilitarianism. H.L.A. Hart 
notwithstanding, the consensus is that wealth maximization 
is consistent with utilitarianism only by coincidence, 
at all.
Without adopting specifically a Kantian or utilitarian 
perspective, a number of writers questioned whether wealth 
maximization consistently generates any consistent set of 
values or normative principles. While all of the points 
made were not accepted, the general conclusion held, that 
wealth maximization does not produce its own system of values,
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or even serve generally accepted values consistently. It
can lead, in fact, to conclusions that are morally unacceptable.
Chapter II did not offer a final judgment on whether 
or not Posner has successfully developed a complete science 
of law. But now, in light of the insights and conclusions 
of the' chapters that followed, it can be concluded that the 
"new" law and economics is not, and should not claim to be 
a complete science of law. This is not to say, however, 
that the economic analysis of law ought to be restricted 
once again to certain areas of the law, such as taxation 
and antitrust, which have been traditionally analyzed in economic 
terms. To understand the proper function of economics in 
jurisprudence, one must understand the distinction between 
law-and-economics, a partial science of law, and economics, 
the universal science of choice. The purpose of Chapter 
V is to argue that economics is a universal science in the 
sense that it contains highly universalized principles, in 
terms of which it can analyse the choice aspect of human 
antion in all departments of life. But it is also argued 
that economics is a handmaiden science, and instrumental, 
not substantive, in its rationality. To repeat yet again, 
economics cannot provide the substance of a system of law.
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V. A Digression on the Nature and 
Significance of Economics
A . Introduction
To this point the dissertation has been mainly a negative 
critique of the "new" law and economics. The remaining 
chapters will attempt to establish positively what economics 
can contribute, in general, to legal theory. A necessary 
first step in that direction is to discuss the nature and 
significance of economic science.
There are those who conclude that economics does not 
have a definable nature, and that the search for a precise 
statement of its essential characteristics has only been a 
waste of time. Pareto, Myrdal and Hutchison are among those 
who hold this view, the most succinct expression of which 
is Jacob Viner's flippant quip that "economics is what economists 
do."
In the other group are those who maintain that efforts 
to define economics have been, and continue to be, utterly 
crucial to the development of the science in all of its fields 
and subfields. Robbins, Knight, Kirzner and others have stressed 
the point that a faulty understanding of the nature of economics 
can lead to mischievous, even disastrous distortions and mis­
applications of theory.
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The present essay adopts the latter view. Just as the 
behavior of an individual is necessarily influenced by his 
own self-image, the directions taken in law and economics 
are necessarily predicated upon an understanding of the nature 
and scope of economics. Thus the economist who seriously 
considers what his science can contribute to legal theory 
must sooner or later turn his attention inward, and focus 
upon the nature of economics itself.
Chapter V will review and interpret the more important 
efforts to .understand the nature of economics. The first 
section sketches the dominant classical and post-classical 
formulations prior to Lionel Robbins' crucial study first 
published in 1932. Robbins' conception of economics is then 
considered in some depth. The final section develops a post- 
Robbins position, which later serves as a foundation-pillar 
for the prudential view of law and economics.
The essence of this post-Robbins position is this:
Positive economic science cannot concern "economic efficiency" 
because this ultimately involves invalid utility comparisons. 
Therefore, the signifcance of economics lies essentially in 
its analysis of choice behavior. In this view economic analysi 
is entirely instrumental, and not concerned with evaluating 
different "states of the world", even in terms of "economic 
efficiency." The implication for law and economics, which 
implication is developed more fully in Chapter VI, is that 
economic analysis must play essentially a handmaiden role 
in legal theory and practice.
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A second central theme developed in the following review 
is that economics has become, in a sort of Popperian manner, 
increasingly universal. That is, the general direction in 
the evolution of economics has been from theories, principles 
and definitions of a lower level of universality to theories, 
etc., of a higher level. Thus the relevance of economics 
has continually extended into new areas of human behavior.
The implication for law and economics, again developed more 
fully in Chapter VI, is that economic analysis is relevant, 
albeit only in an instrumental way, to virtually all areas 
of the law.
The present chapter is not intended as a review of those 
who have interpreted the efforts to define economics. In 
other words, the focus is upon the "primary" literature of 
Smith, Say, Mill, Hayek, Robbins and others rather than the 
"secondary" literature (of which there is a tremendous volume) 
which interprets Smith, Say, Mill, etc. The purpose of Chapter 
V is to offer a particular interpretation of the "primary" 
literature concerning the nature and scope of economics.
This interpretation happens to differ somewhat from previous 
interpretations, and a full treatment of both "primary" and 
"secondary" literature could discuss these differences at 
some length. The constraints of time and space preclude such 
a discussion here.
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B. Classical and Post-Classical Formulations
In general, economists of the Classical period defined 
economics as the study of the nature and causes of wealth.
Thus their efforts to define economics were in large measure 
attempts to define the meaning of wealth. This is not to 
say that the Classicists (or economists who came later, for 
that matter) were preoccupied with philosophically under­
standing the nature of wealth as pertaining to the sustenance 
of the Soul. The Classicists tended to take a rather common- 
sense, even materialistic view of wealth; besides, they were 
ultimately more interested in the causes of wealth than in 
defining it. Their search for a reasonably precise statement 
of the nature of wealth reflected the recognition that their 
young science could not develop with order and direction until 
the object of its inquiries was clearly in view. As J. B. Say 
put it:
How, indeed was it possible to 
become acquainted with the causes of 
material prosperity when no clear 
or distinct notions had been formed 
respecting the nature of wealth 
itself? . . . The object of our
investigations must be thoroughly 
perceived before the meaijis of attain­
ing it are sought after.
The Classicists were not in unanimous agreement as to 
the proper definition of wealth. The principal debate concerned 
whether or not the term should encompass non-material as well 
as material goods. The discussion began with Adam Smith's 
distinction between "productive" and "unproductive" labor.
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The material fruits of "productive" labor were placed in a
separate category from the i material products of "unproductive" 
2labor. Thus materiality became, for most Classicists, the 
criterion of wealth, whether Smith actually intended such 
a delimitation or not.
Most prominent among those who explicitly restricted 
the category of wealth to material goods was Malthus.
"The fact is", he writes, "that if we once desert matter in 
the definition of wealth, there is no subsequent line of
3
demarcation which has any tangible degree of distinctiness,. "
Malthus was correct in the implicit principle that a
description which excludes very little also describes very
inadequately. The question is whether materiality is the
appropriate criterion of exclusion for purposes of economic
analysis. J. B. Say and J. S. Mill were predominant among
those who included nonmaterial objects in the category of
wealth. Both understood the necessity for some bond in logic
among the objects to be considered as wealth, i.e., they felt
that any useful description of wealth ought to be quite clear
as to what is not wealth. They just did not see materiality
as a useful criterion in economics. Say, for instance, contends
that Smith and Malthus
. . . should have included . . . values
which, although immaterial, are not 
less real, such as natural or acquired 
talents. Of two individuals equally 
destitute of fortune, the one in 
possession of a particular talent^is 
by no means so poor as the other.
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Say made the idea of wealth a much more universal concept
in what he termed "utility":
Production is the creation, not of 
matter but of utility . . . The
value that mankind attaches to 
objects originates in the use it 
can make of them. Some afford 
sustenance; others serve for 
clothing; some defend them from 
the inclemencies of the seasons, 
as houses; others gratify their 
tastes, or at^all events, their 
vanity . . ."
Say's concept of utility was very close to what the
term means for economists today; thus, in retrospect it may
seem peculiar that economists after Say retreated from
utility to more particularistic definitions of wealth.
Actually, it may not be that utility was altogether rejected
as an abstract concept in pure theory. It must be remembered
that the classicists were practicing the art of Political
Economy, the purpos.e of which they understood to be the pursuit
of economic goods, the most urgent of which, in that day and
age, were material things. Thus we find Mill agreeing with
Say that wealth ought to be defined as utility, for purely
theoretical purposes, yet choosing not to use the term in
that context. He explicitly agrees with Say that "to produce"
means, ultimately, to produce utility:
In the first place, even in what is 
called the production of material 
objects, it must be remembered that 
what is produced is not the matter 
composing them . . . Though we cannot
create matter, we can cause it to 
assume properties, by which, from 
having been useless to us, it be­
comes useful. What we produce, or
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desire to produce, is -always, as ^
M. Say rightly terms it, an utility.
Later on he reasserts the theoretical correctness of
the concept of utility, as well as the term:
[W]e should regard all labor as 
productive which is employed in 
creating permanent utilities . . .
This nomenclature I have, in a 
former publication, recommended, 
as most conducive to the ends of
classification; ^ n d I am still
of that opinion.
Mill's reluctance to employ the term "utility" synon­
ymously with "wealth" seems to stem entirely from his desire
not to go against the grain of common usage:
But in applying the term wealth 
to the industrial capacities of 
human beings, there seems always, 
in popular apprehension, to be a 
tacit reference to material prod­
ucts . . .  I shall, therefore, in
this treatise, when speaking of
wealth, understand by it only what 
is called material wealth, and by 
productive labor only those kinds 
of exertion which produce utilities 
embodied in material objects.
The period in which economics was considered as regarding
material wealth coincided roughly with the Classical period.
Economists after this period continued to define economics
as the science of wealth, but there was a distinct emphasis
of the non-material nature of wealth, especially in the writings
of the marginal utility theorists in the late 19th Century.
Jevons makes the etymological point that the word "wealth"
derives from we a l , which signifies the state of well-being,
9of welfare in a general sense. Menger held essentially the 
same notion of wealth as Jevons did, but was more explicit
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about the subjectiveness of the concept. He maintained that 
wealth included even "imaginary" goods, "things . . .  as derive 
their goods-character merely from properties they are imagined 
to possess, or from needs merely imagined by men . .
Gradually the notion of welfare replaced that of 
material wealth. According to Kirzner, the idea that economics 
is essentially concerned with welfare was the most generally 
accepted view among English and American economists by the 
end of the 19th C e n t u r y . ^  Thus it might be said that Jevons, 
Menger and other marginal utility theorists were able to bring 
to fruition the seeds planted back in the Classical period 
by Say.
There are, however, some important similarities between 
the material wealth and welfare conceptions of economics.
Both are "departmental" rather than "analytical", as Kirzner 
put it. In other words, both define economics in terms of 
something produced, be it material goods or subjective utility, 
rather than in terms of a distinct type of activity. Indeed, 
the definitions in terms of welfare and utility are generaliza­
tions of the original definition in terms of material wealth. 
From Malthus to Menger, changes in how economists conceived 
their science were evolutionary, the evolution being towards 
increasingly universal definitions of the products of economic 
activity.
A different trend among post-Classical theorists could 
be described as revolutionary, for it shifted attention away 
from the products of economic activity and focused upon the
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nature of the activity itself. This approach saw economics 
as necessarily connected with the act of exchange in one way 
or another .
Initially, theorists in the exchange tradition saw economics
as revolving around a fairly limited concept of exchange.
Archbishop Whately, one of the first theorist to make exchange
the very essence of economic activity, wrote in 1831 that
"the name I should have preferred as the most descriptive
. . . is that of CATALLACTICS, or the 'Science of Exchanges'.^
It is clear that exchange for Whately meant interpersonal
exchange, for he insisted that "Robinson Crusoe is in a position
1 3of which Political Economy takes no cognizance."
Whately did not define economics in terms of the nature 
of things being exchanged and his reluctance to do so was 
the source of much criticism from those steeped in the 
Classical tradition. Henry George, for example, contended 
that "without the clog of an object-noun political economy 
. . . has plunged out of existence . . . " ̂  Franklin H.
Giddings argued before the American Economic Association in 
1887 that "that definition of Political Economy which calls 
it the science of exchanges is a b s u r d . " ^
Despite the alleged absurdity of the "catallactics" approach, 
it eventually attained a measure of popularity, thanks largely 
to the American A. L. Perry. He embraced the catallactics 
approach of Whately precisely because it enabled economists 
to avoid the definitional quagmire of the wealth approach.
Perry's tack is rather ingenious. First, he replaces "wealth"
with "value” , then construes value as being synonymous, in
essence, with "the terms of trade":
Political economy is the science
of value, and of nothing else . . .
Value is a relative word. It is 
usually def^ged as purchasing 
power . . .
And regarding the value of gold:
It is not a quality in and of 
itself, of gold, but a relation 
which gold holds to other things 
which gold will buy. The notion 
of value is not conceivable 
except by a comparison of two 
things, and what is more, <j>̂ two 
things mutually exchanged.
Thus for Perry there is no need for definitions of wealth; 
no criterion of wealth external to the exchange process itself 
is required. He nonetheless held a relatively constricted 
view of the process of exchange, as Whately did before him. 
Perhaps "specific" is a more appropriate adjective, for they 
both seemed to envision specific individuals trading in specifi 
markets for specific rewards. Put differently, they seemed 
to be focusing on functional relationships between individual 
economic agents rather than the totality of the system of 
exchanges.
The first economist of prominence to focus explicitly 
upon the totality of the system was Basiat. In his Economic 
Harmonies, he was concerned with explaining the efficiency 
with which the laissez-faire economic system, a "prodigiously 
ingenious mechanism", in his words, produced relatively copious 
quantities of economic goods. "This mechanism", he stressed,
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18"is the object of study of political economy." Wicksteed
is another whose primary interest was the exposition of the
entire system of economic relationships. "The industrial
world", he wrote, "is a spontaneous organization for transmitting
1 9what every man has into what he desires."
Perhaps the most eminent 20th Century theorist who object­
ified the general order of economic activity is F. A. von 
Hayek. The following passage from "The Trend of Economic 
Thinking" is an especially lucid statement of this perception 
of economics: '
In the natural sciences, we have . 
learned that the interaction of 
different tendencies may produce 
what we call an order, without any 
mind of our own kind regulating it.
But we still refuse to recognize 
that the spontaneous interplay of 
the actions of individuals may 
produce something which is not the 
deliverate object of their actions 
but an organism in which every part 
performs a necessary function . . .
without any human mind having 
devised it. . . . The recognition of
this organism is the recognition 
that there2^s a subject-matter for 
economics.
The most ambitious attempt to generalize the concept 
of exchange is represented by Schumpeter's purely formal 
exchange of "economic quantities". Speaking of the 
Classicists, Schumpeter charges that "they did not suffi­
ciently realize themselves that exchange value is but a 
special form of a universal coefficient of transformation
on the derivation of which pivots the whole logic of economic 
2 1phenomena." Exchange for Schumpeter is the completely
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generalized concept of achieving some different configuration
of goods. It can conceivably involve only a single individual:
when Robinson Crusoe hunts game, he "exchanges" time, energy
and capital for food. In fact, E. R. A. Seligman has argued
that Schumpeterian exchange can be purely mental. In his
words, "Crusoe exchanges in his mind apples and nuts in estima-
22ting their value to him."
It might be helpful to summarize the discussion up to 
this point in the context of Kirzner's distinction between 
the "departmental" approach to defining the scope and nature 
of economics, which focuses on the products of economic activity, 
and the "analytical" approach, which examines the nature of 
the activity itself. The Classicists clearly took the depart­
mental approach, defining economics in terms of wealth, and 
though Say and a few others insisted upon a nonmaterial defini­
tion of wealth, the predominant classical conception was 
materialistic. The marginal utility theorists popularized 
a more universal, nonmaterialistic notion of wealth, and by 
the close of the 19th Century, it was generally accepted that 
what economic activity produces, ultimately, is "welfare"—  
a concept virtually identical with the "subjective utility" 
of modern micro theory.
The "analytical" approach was first expressed in Whately's 
rather constricted view of exchange. Later the context of 
exchange broadened into the view of Bastiat and Hayek, who 
saw the general order of the system of exchanges as the subject- 
matter of economics. Finally, Schumpeter articulated a purely
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formal concept of exchange which .has been interpreted simply 
as deliberation— the "mental exchange" in Seligman's interpreta­
tion— which characterizes all purposive action.
Though the point is seldom emphasized, one important 
aspect of the evolution of both approaches is the tendency 
to make each new formulation more universal than the one before 
it. In order to understand better the path that this branch 
of economic thought has taken, it is helpful to envision two 
roads. The roads begin as separate, rather narrow tracks, 
but as the roads extend they broaden, thus reducing the distance 
between them. Eventually the roads broaden enough that they 
make contact, and join. Then they are seen not as two separate 
roads, but as different parts of the same road. Likewise, 
the different approaches to defining economics have broadened, 
and made contact, and become different parts of the same general 
conception. The theorist who is most responsible for achieving 
the synthesis of these separate approaches is Lionel Robbins.
C. Lionel Robbins
Since the publication in 1932 of Lionel Robbins'
Nature and Significance of Economic Science, discussions of
the problem of defining economics have tended to revolve around
Robbins' formulation. Indeed, 'he is regarded by many as having
solved the problem once and for all. As Tagliacozza put it:
Before Robbins' definition, criticism 
of economics on the ground of its being 
"too wide" or "too narrow" was still 
understandable. Now, however, such 
discussions have become meaningless: 
economics is a given pie, which the
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economist is only allowed to dress a 
bit, to cut as deeply and into as many 
parts as he lushes and to eat according 
to his ne e d .
The present discussion will argue two general points. The
first is that Robbins' formulation can best be understood
as a synthesis of the approach which focused on the ends of
economic activity, and the approach which focused on the nature
of the activity itself. The second point is that for all
that is correct in Robbins' conception of the nature of economics,
he still fails to recognize precisely the boundaries, hence
the true significance, of economic science: much of what
he considers to be a part of economics proper belongs actually
to the para-scientific realm of welfare economics.
The core of Robbins' conception is the relationship of
means to ends:
From the point of view of the economist, 
the conditions of human existence 
exhibit four fundamental characteristics.
The ends are various. The time and the 
means for achieving these ends are 
limited and capable of alternative 
application. At the same time the ends 
have different importance . . . The
external world does not offer full 
opportunities for their complete 
achievement.
Now b_y_ itself the multiplicity of 
ends has no necessary interest for the 
economist. If I want to do two things, 
and I have ample time and ample means 
with which to do them, and I do not 
want the time or the means for anything 
else, then my conduct assumes none of 
those forms which are the subject of 
economic science . . .
But when time and the means for 
achieving ends are limited and capable
110
of alternative application, and the ends 
are capable of being distinguished in 
order of importance, then behavior 
necessarily assumes the form of ^jaoice 
. . . It has an economic aspect.
Scarcity, in a word, characterizes the relationship of 
means to ends. The limitations of means prevent the full 
attainment of ends, and thus affects the character of all 
activity in the pursuit of those ends. It is this relation­
ship between means and ends, rather than either the means 
or ends themselves, which is fundamental in Robbins' conception 
of economics. Th’us he rejects the idea that the definition 
of economics turns entirely upon any particular concept of 
either means or ends.
Regarding specifically the "material wealth" definition
of ends, he states that it
. . . may cover the field, but it does
not describe it. For it is not the 
materiality of even material means 
of gratification which gives them 
their status as economic goods; it is 
their relationship to given wants 
rather than their t e ^ n i c a l  substance 
which is signifcant.
Elaborating on the status of ends, Robbins brings out
the point that only the most generalized, least exclusionary
conception of ends would be appropriate.
It should be clear, therefore, that 
to speak of any end as being itself 
"economic" is entirely misleading.
The habit, prevalent among certain 
groups of economists, of discussing 
"economic satisfactions" is alien to 
the central intention of economic 
analysis. A satisfaction is to be 
conceived as an end-product of acti-
I l l
vity. It is not itself part of that 
activity which we study . . .
The economist is not concerned 
with ends as such. He is concerned 
with the way in which the attainment 
of ends is limited. The ends may be 
noble or they may be base. They may 
be "material" or "immater^gl"--if 
ends can be so described.
With the purely formal concept of exchange attributed 
to Schumpeter, the approach to economics which focused on 
exchange had reached its logically most universal formulation.
The activity was no longer restricted to interpersonal 
exchanges, or even those that are actual, as distinguished 
from purely potential. Exchange had come to mean "the 
techniques of production" in the most general sense, the 
variation of different sets of "economic quantities".
For Robbins, the category of means is roughly synony­
mous with this all-inclusive concept of exchange. As with 
ends, Robbins clearly rejects the idea that economics is concerned 
only with particular kinds of means:
The technical arts of production are 
simply to be grouped among the given 
factors influencing the relative 
scarcity of different economic goods.
The technicque of cotton manufacture, 
as such, is no part of the subject- 
matter of Economics, but the existence 
of a given technique of various poten­
tialities, together with the other 
factors influencing supply, condition 
the possible response to any valuation 
of cotton goods, and consequently 
influences the adaptations which it 27 
is the business of Economics to study.
Thus we see again that for Robbins it is the relationship 
of means to ends, both universally conceived, that forms
112
the character of economic problems.
It follows from the argument of the 
preceding sections that the subject- 
matter of Economics is essentially a 
series of relationships--relationships 
between ends conceived as the possible 
objectives of conduct on the one hand, 
and the technical and social environ­
ment on the other . . .
The nature of Economic Theory is 
clear. It is the study of the formal 
implications of these relationships 
of ends and means on various assumptions 
c o n c e d i n g  the nature of the ultimate 
data .
Robbins thus synthesized the previous approaches to / 
defining economics by way of the ends— means dichotomy.
The concepts of multitudinous ends and limited means are both 
indispensable in his description of economics, for without 
both there would be no scarcity and no need for economizing 
behavior. And it is precisely this economizing aspect of 
human behavior that economic science investigates.
Robbins''characterization of the nature of economics 
is perfectly correct as far as it goes. However, in his 
discussion of the significance of economics he goes further, 
and crosses over the border that separates economic science 
from the para-scientific field of welfare economics.
Welfare economics attempts to establish, as a matter 
of scientific fact, whether a given policy has a beneficial 
or a deleterious effect upon total social welfare. The data 
of welfare economics are ultimately different persons' 
experiences of satisfaction; hence, they are subjective and 
cannot be objectively observed. The term "social" implies
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more than one person, so 'social welfare might be defined loosely 
as the aggregate of all individuals' subjective satisfaction, 
as derived from the consumption of economic goods, and altered 
through the redistribution of those goods.
The fact that satisfactions are subjective means that 
one person cannot truly experience another's satisfactions, 
any more than one can experience another's subjective 
perceptions of color or sound. There is necessarily a degree 
of agnosticism about any comparison of subjective experiences: 
Peter might assume the color red is perceived identically 
by Paul, but there can be no certainty about it. And so it 
is with subjective satisfactions. Thus the welfare economist 
faces an inevitable cul-de-sac, since the interpersonal compar­
isons involved in attempting to solve distributional conflicts 
can never really be a matter of scientific demonstration.
A number of ingenious "compensation criteria" have been 
formulated to serve as a guide in reasoning, but they are 
a matter of convention, ultimately, and can make no claim 
to scientific validity. This is not to deny the scientific 
validity of the so-called Pareto criterion, by which at least 
one party is benefited while no party is made worse off.
But there is no meaningful sense in which Pareto redistri­
butions can be said to involve distributional conflicts.
Few economists now deny the insuperability of the 
problem of interpersonal utility comparisons. The Samuelson- 
Bergson welfare function represents a valiant attempt to 
generate solutions to distributional problems within the
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context of a model which accepts subjective satisfacttions
as the ultimate data. But the effort is rather like trying
to squeeze blood from a turnip, as Kenneth Arrow's Impossibility
Theorem suggests. Arrow proved that if satisfactions are
incomparable, and dictatorial imposition is not allowed to
supersede subjective satisfaction, then no set of rules exists
to construct a social welfare function in the manner of Samuel-
2 9son and Bergson. Thus in 1969 Maurice Dobb was able to 
conclude that the discussion of interpersonal utility compari­
sons had become "increasingly restricted in scope and appears
30now to have reached a dead end."
Returning now to Robbins, there is every reason to believe 
that he would agree with the preceding assessment of the scienti­
fic status of welfare economics. In an address before the 
American Economic Association in 1981, he concluded that
. . . the New Welfare Economics . . . has
broken down in the strictly scientific 
sense and left us with the fundamental 
implications of the passage in Jevons 
which I have already quoted, namely 
that all recommendations of^jolicy 
involve judgments of value.
Robbins' mistake is not that he fails to see the limitations
of welfare economics, but that he fails to see the limitations
of "positive" economics. Much of what he would call positive
economics is actually in the realm of welfare economics.
Put differently, it is not so much the nature of economic
science which Robbins misunderstands, but its significance.
It should be noted t-hat when Robbins speaks of the
significance of economics he has in mind not merely the laws
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and generalizations that form the theoretic substance of
the science. He means instead the value of economics as
a guide to social choice; in his words, "the bearing of Economic
3 2Science of practice". He expresses his view of the signifi­
cance of economics succinctly in the following passage from 
The Nature and Significance of Economic Science;
But what, then, is the significance 
of Economic Science? We have seen 
that it provides, within its own 
structure of generalizations, no 
norms which are binding in practice.
It is incapable of deciding as between 
the desirability of different ends.
It is fundamentally distinct from 
ethics. Wherein, then, does its 
unquestionable significance consist?
Surely it consists in just this, 
that, when we are faced with a choice 
between ultimates, it enables us to 
choose with full awareness of the 
implications of what we are choosing . . .
There is nothing in any science that can 
decide the ultimate problem of 
preference. But, to the rational, we 
must know what it is we prefer. We 
must be aware of the objective impli- ^5 
cations of the alternatives of choice.
Robbins comments further on what he means by "the
objective implication of the alternatives of choice":
It is not rational to will a certain 
end if one is not conscious of what 
sacrifice the achievement of that end 
involves. And, in this supreme weighing 
of alternatives, only a complete aware­
ness of the implications of modern 
economic analysis can c o n f ^  the capa­
city to judge rationally.
Clearly Robbins feels that economics cannot judge the 
ends of our actions, but can evaluate the means in some objective
sense. Particularly, he seems to be saying that while economics
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cannot judge the correctness or ultimate goodness of an end,
it nonetheless can evaluate objectively the efficiency with
which society pursues that end. The idea that the significance
of economics, for Robbins, has much to do with efficiency
is supported by his lengthy discussion in Nature of what he
terms the "criterion of economy". He states, in part, that:
The criterion of economy which follows 
from our original definitions is the 
securing of given ends with least 
means. It is, therefore, perfectly 
intelligible to say of a certain policy 
that it is uneconomical, if, in order 
to achieve certain ends, it uses more 
scarce means than are necessary . . .
We cannot say that the pursuit of given 
ends is uneconomical because the ends 
are uneconomical; we can only say it 
is uneconomical if the ends are pursued 
with a ^ u n n e c e s s a r y  expenditure of 
means.
He goes on to distinguish between technical and economic
efficiency:
To use a conventional jargon, it is 
important to bear in mind the distinc­
tion between technical and value pro­
ductivity. The mass production of 
particular things, irrespective of 
demand for them, however technically 
efficient, is not necessarily 
"economical" . . . For a blacksmith
producing for a small and isolated 
community to specialize solely on the 
production of a certain type of horse­
shoe, in order to secure the economies 
of mass production, would be folly.
After he has made a limited number of 
shoes of one size, it is clearly better 
for him to turn his attention to  ̂5
producing shoes of other sizes . . .
The problem with Robbins’ discussion here is not the
distinction between technical and economic efficiency, but
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in the presumptive conclusion that "it is clearlybetter"
for the blacksmith to produce a different size shoe. Here
Robbins seems to have accepted implicitly some measure of
comparative value among different buyers of horseshoes.
But if this is so, then he has contradicted other conclusions
reached in Nature. Consider, for example, his comments on
the Law of Diminishing Marginal Utility:
The "Law of Diminishing Marginal 
Utility" . . . does not follow in the
least from the fundamental conception 
of economic goods; and it makes assump­
tions which, whether they are true or 
false, can never be verified by obser­
vation or introspection. The proposi­
tion we are examining begs the great 
metaphysical question of the 
scientific comparability of different 
individual experiences.
The horseshoes example clearly employs the Law of 
Diminishing Marginal Utility to support the contention that, 
beyond some point, it is economically inefficient to produce 
additional units of a particular good. Buy how can it be 
demonstrated precisely when enough is enough; and what kinds 
of evidence would be admissible? In point of fact, the 
criterion of economy is scientifically undemonstrable on 
precisely the same grounds that "social welfare" is undemonstr­
able; namely, it necessitates interpersonal comparisons of 
subjective satisfaction. For if there is to be any economic 
measure of "means", it must ultimately be in the common 
denominator of the satisfaction value of ends. To what does 
"expenditure of means" refer if not the loss in satisfaction 
from ends forfeited when scarce means are committed to an
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alternative end?
An aspect of Robbins' thought which is crucial to note 
is that he consistently conceives the value of ends as subject­
ive, but the value of means as somehow objectively measurable. 
This tendency to view means objectively overlooks the mediate 
status of means: they matter only as they contribute to
the attainment of ends. Thus it seems that Robbins fails 
to appreciate the derivative subjectiveness of means.
The problem may be understood more generally as a failure 
to recognize the arbitrariness of the ends-means dichotomy.
No economic good is singularly an end or a means, but may 
be either, depending upon the perspective of the analysis.
It is perfectly correct to consider the hammer and anvil 
as means in the production of horseshoes. But in a different, 
yet equally correct, analysis, horseshoes are themselves 
means in the production of transportation. Robbins seems 
to conceive of ends and means as absolute categories, and 
from there it is but a small step to the presumption of concrete, 
objectively defined means in terms of which efficiency is 
scientifically demonstrable. This is not to say the ends- 
means dichotomy is not useful for analyzing behavior in 
a choice-theoretical context. The point is that the dichotomy 
establishes no category, and generates no data, in which 
to ground the criterion of economy. The latter is inescapably 
a non-scientific concept. Thus while efficiency may be 
an intelligible concept, the significance of economics, its 
"bearing on practice" can hardly rest upon it.
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If the: principle of economic efficiency is non- 
scientific, then one might wonder whether or not economic 
science has any significance at all. Fortunately, there is 
life after efficiency for economic science. The principal 
purpose of the next section is to reinterpret the significance 
of economic science.
D. After Robbins: A Suggested Reinterpretation
The preceding section argued that Robbins' "criterion 
of economy" belongs in the para-scientific realm of welfare 
economics with other criteria that involve interpersonal 
comparisons of subjective utility in the calculation of 
aggregate "welfare" in one sense or another. The present 
section will argue that there is significance to economic 
science apart from such welfare considerations. It should 
be reiterated that what distinguishes the suggested post- 
Robbins understanding of economics is neither its view of 
the economic problem nor its approach to analyzing choice 
behavior. It is singularly in the significance it attaches 
to economics that it takes exception with Robbins.
Very generally put, the significance of economic science 
is that it explains purposive human action in a choice- 
theoretic context. By formally modeling the rationality 
of choice, economists are able to explain a remarkable range 
of activities, from decisions about the purchasing of market 
goods to the manifestation of altruism in familial relation­
ships.
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As the science of choice, economics can suggest ways
to structure incentives so as to achieve desired patterns
of behavior. For instance, Gary Becker has demonstrated
that whether the probability of punishment is more effective
than the severity of punishment in deterring crime depends
3 8upon the degree to which the offender is averse to risk.
This conclusion seems intuitively reasonable, but often
the conclusions of highly formalized models go beyond immediate
intuition; therein lies the value of mathematics, of course.
39One example is Isaac Ehrlich's model of criminal activity. 
Building on Becker's analysis, Ehrlich demonstrates that 
if an offender were risk preferring, an increase in the average 
penalty per offense might not deter his participation in 
crime. In fact, it could have precisely the opposite effect. 
This conclusion is hardly intuitive, yet it is consistent 
with the observed behavior of some criminals. It is suggestive 
of the usefulness of economics that it can explain and predict 
such behavior without having to resort to ad. hoc "explanations" 
in terms of irrationality or inherent vagaries of human 
behavior.
Economic science can help determine whether different 
policies are consistent and harmonious, or contradictory 
and at cross-purposes. Do we want protective tariffs or 
more trade, easy money or less inflation, minimum wages or 
a lower unemployment rate?
Economics can trace out the effects, in terms of external
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behavior, of a change in tastes and preferences. For 
instance, there would be some obvious, and some not-so- 
obvious repercussions of an end to racial prejudice, and 
economic analysis can help us to understand better what 
those repercussions might be. Becker argues, for example, 
that when whites discriminate against blacks, the incomes 
of both groups are reduced. However, an end to discrimina­
tion would, under certain circumstances, increase the net 
income of discriminators more than those discriminated against.*
Similarly, economic analysis can suggest the effects 
of a change in technology upon prices, incomes, and so on. 
Examples would be virtually endless, but to reiterate the 
general point, economics allows for a relatively comprehensive 
awareness of the consequences in terms of external behavior.
The point should be emphasized that economics is concerned 
only with explaining external behavior. That is, it must 
take as "given" characteristics which are "internal" to the 
individual: tastes, preferences and quirks of personality.
For example, psychology would perhaps relate one's taste 
for green shirts to a childhood fixation on one's scoutmaster. 
Economics would address the very different matter of one's 
demand for green shirts as related to income, prices and 
other external constraints. As another example, tracing 
out the effects of a change in racial attitudes is not the 
same thing as explaining the psychology of racial preference.
Whenever economists have discussed the significance 
of their science, one point is made virtually without
exception, namely that pure economic science is positive,
not normative. In the words of McKenzie and Tullock:
The approach of the economist is 
amoral. Economics is not concerned 
with what should b e , or how indivi­
duals should behave, but rather with 
understandin^why people behave the 
way they do.
Concerning the positive-normative distinction, several 
points must be made. First, the distinction being drawn 
here between positive and normative is not the distinction 
made earlier between what is scientifically demonstrable and 
what is not. Second, the positive-normative distinction 
is not the same thing as the fact-value distinction. Third, 
economic science is indeed amoral, but not in the sense 
conveyed by the most of the more recent discussions.
It was argued above that efficiency is para-scientific 
because it involves interpersonal comparisons of utility. 
Efficiency in the economic sense, i.e., in terms of utility, 
is not scientifically demonstrable. Thus, it was argued, 
we are left with a pure theory of choice which expresses 
its conclusions always in terms of external behavior, but 
never in terms of efficiency. It is quite a different thing 
to say, as the McKenzie and Tullock quotation above says, 
that economic science embodies no moral principles, or endorses 
no ethical system. Suppose, for instance, that subjective 
utility were somehow perfectly measurable. In this case 
economic efficiency would be scientifically demonstrable, 
but economic science would not thereby become a kind of 
philosophical utilitarianism. To describe, even perfectly,
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the set of circumstances under which utility is maximized
is not to argue that utility ought to be maximized. Man
is assumed to act in pursuit of subjective utility; this
is the ultimate foundation of economics. But, as Milton
Friedman put it, "The function that enables us to predict
how a consuming unit does behave is not necessarily the same
42function that would tell what is desirable".
It is no surprise that economics has been confused 
with philosophical utilitarianism, but to their credit economists 
have produced a vast volume of literature disassociating 
the one from the other. Unfortunately they have done 
much, albeit perhaps unintentionally, to confuse economic 
science with a different normative system, namely, democracy.
Here "democracy" is used in the context of a political philos­
ophy, not merely as signifying a method for selecting governmen­
tal leaders. The present context is that of Plato in his 
discussion of democracy in the Republic. For Plato, democracy 
is truly a philosophy in the fullest sense. Democracy's 
first principle is the fact— value distinction, i.e., the 
notion that values are not grounded in facts, that the 
two are of fundamentally different ontological status.
Democracy's supposed virtues are freedom, variety, and above 
all, equality. Plato describes the democratic man, the 
"man attached to the law of equality" as one who
. . . doesn't admit true speech or let
it pass into the guardhouse, if someone 
says that there are some pleasures 
belonging to bad desires, and that the
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ones must be protected and honored and 
the others checked and enslaved. Rather, 
he shakes his head at all this and says 
that all are a l i k e ^ n d  must be honored 
on an equal basis.
Plato goes on to argue that democracy is a sorry 
condition of state and of soul, eventually degenerating 
further into tyranny. But the purpose here is not to critique 
Plato's political and ethical philosophy. The point is to 
argue that what many economists consider "value-free" economics 
is actually thoroughly infused with the substance of demo­
cratic political philosophy. Let us return to McKenzie and 
Tullock and finish the quotation presented in part above.
Note the similarity with Plato's description of democracy:
Like everyone else, we have our own 
value systems . . .  We also recognize 
that you have your own values and we 
in no way suggest that you dispense 
with them . . . All we ask is that you
allow us the opportunity to address 
the question of why such phenomena 
[as prostitution and political cor­
ruption] occur. In the process you 
may find a solution to the problem 
that is more consistent with your 
values thgg the solution you now 
perceive .
Mises has expounded similarly on the "positive"
character of economic theory:
Ethical doctrines are intent upon 
establishing scales of value accord­
ing to which men should act but does 
not necessarily always act . . . They
are not neutral with regard to facts; 
they judge them from the point of 
view of freely adopted standards.
This is not the attitude of 
praxeology and economics. They are
fully aware of the fact that the 
ultimate ends of human action are not 
open to examination from any absolute 
standard . . . Any examination of ulti­
mate ends turns out to be purely ^  
subjective and therefore arbitrary.
Mises offers no substantive support for his contention 
that there can be no rational discussion of ends, so the 
statement itself must be taken as a value judgment. It is 
one thing to point out that economic science is not ethics, 
but quite another thing to assert that there cannot be an 
objective evaluation of ends qua ends.
Mises and others are correct in describing economic 
science as amoral. The study of morality and ethics is 
certainly distinct from the study of economic principles.
It is objectionable, however, when they go on, usually in 
the same paragraph, to assert that all "ends" are necessar­
ily of equal status. This is democratic political philo­
sophy, not economics, and the two must be distinguished 
if the significance of economics is to be properly understood.
This chapter has striven to develop a correct under­
standing of the nature and significance of economic science. 
The result is a rather more servile view of economics than 
most economists would, or at least have, endorsed. It is 
the principal contention of this essay that while economics 
is app-licable to the choice aspect of human behavior in all 
departments of life, it is none-the-less essentially a hand­
maiden science, and instrumental, not substantive in its 
rationality. Economists ought not to be ashamed to admit 
this view, but most apparently are. They are compelled,
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for one reason or another, to spin pretentious theories of 
"efficiency" and "wealth maximization" which are ultimately 
devoid of substance though they give the appearance of precise 
guidance .
The following chapter will propose, on the basis of 
this view of economics, a "prudential" law and economics 
which sees jurisprudence not as Science, but as Art. The 
economic analysis must unashamedly accept as given the ends 
of policy, and the values upon which they rest. It must 
acknowledge reliance upon moral and ethical principles which 
are inherently more difficult to demonstrate than the laws 
of natural science.
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VI. Toward a Prudential Law and Economics
In light of the criticism of the new law and economics, 
and the discussion of the nature of economic science, what 
can be concluded about the proper role of economic analysis 
in legal theory? In answering this question, the present 
chapter will propose a "prudential" approach to law and economics. 
The prudential law and economics does not claim to be a complete 
theory of law. In fact, it is not a theory of law at all.
One cannot apply the prudential analysis to a particular 
problem and generate "the solution", as one supposedly can 
with Posner's wealth maximization analysis. Thus it makes 
little sense to speak of comparing the policy conclusions 
of the "new" and the "prudential" analyses. The prudential 
analysis is not a "theory" or "system" of law, as the "new" 
law and economics claims to be. It is rather an attitude 
about the significance of economics in all areas of legal 
theory, a perspective on the role which economic analysis 
should play in the formulation and administration of the 
law.
The essence of the prudential approach is the understanding 
that economics is purely an instrumental science, and ultimately 
of no service in answering substantive questions on the nature 
of harm and injury. The prudential view recognizes that
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questions of value necessarily dissolve into a discussion 
of "morals and aesthetics," to borrow again the terminology 
of Ronald Coase.
"The basic function of the law", Posner wrote in Economic 
Analysis of La w , "is to alter incentives." To alter incentives 
is an instrumental function of the law; this does not, however, 
say anything about its substantive purpose. The distinction 
between function and purpose, as the terms are used here, 
is that between means and ends. It is crucial for under­
standing how the prudential and Posnerian wealth maximization 
approaches differ, for the prudential view sees economics 
as concerning only function, whereas economics regards both 
function and purpose in the Posnerian view.
Elsewhere in Economic Analysis of Law Posner offers
what might seem to be a relatively "prudential" conception
of the significance of economic analysis of law:
Although (the economist) cannot tell society 
whether it should seek to limit theft, 
he can show that it would be inefficient 
to allow unlimited theft; he can thus 
clarify a value conflict by showing how 
much of one value— efficiency, surely 
an important, if not necessarily 
paramount, value in any society— ^iust 
be sacrificed to achieve another.
Though "value clarification" may seem a modest enough 
goal--"positive", at least— a little reflection will reveal 
that it is neither modest nor positive. Establishing pre­
cisely "how much of one value must be sacrificed to achieve 
another" is quite a task. The prudential law and economics 
assigns a much more instrumental, less substantive role
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to economic analysis. Economics is assumed, in the prudential 
conception, to concern only external behavior. Evaluating 
that behavior by comparing sacrifices of one value with 
gains of another is considered beyond the reach of economics. 
The prudential law and economics is grounded in the under­
standing that economics is equally devoid of substantive 
rationality as say, chemistry or physics.
There is, then, this crucial difference between the 
Posnerian and prudential analyses: The former takes economics
beyond purely instrumental reasoning to the evaluation 
of different states; the latter strictly confines economic 
analysis to the instrumental role of understanding external 
behavior and some of the means by which it can be modified.
In the terminology suggested at the beginning of this section, 
the Posnerian law and economics is concerned with both 
function and purpose, but the prudential analysis deals 
only with the former
The prudential law and economics should not be understood 
as a wholesale rejection of the methodologies of Coase,
Becker and Posner. It was argued above that the analyses 
of Coase and Becker are essentially instrumental; therefore 
they are, for the most part, acceptable as prudential theory.
Even much of the analysis of Posnex, including some 
of his work, is economically correct, and would be a legitimate 
part of the prudential law and economics. There is, however, 
a distinctly "prudential" interpretation of their work.
A few examples will illustrate the point.
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Consider a "Coasian" analysis of the "externality" 
problem created when a confectioner's machinery rendered 
a doctor's instruments unusable because of noise and vibration.
In the prudential perspective the significance of the analysis
lies entirely in tracing out the responses of the actors
to possible legal solutions. It is important to understand,
for instance, that if there are "zero transactions costs",
then the initial assignment of rights--the right of the confecioner
to use his machinery, or the right of the doctor to quiet--
will not determine the final allocation of rights. The firm
whose product is most valuable will purchase the right to
continue its production. Assuming that both parties are
profit maximizers, an economic analysis of their actions
in the choice-theoretic context leads to this conclusion.
If transactions costs are high, on the other hand, the initial 
assignment might be final, depending upon the costs of nego­
tiating, and the effect on profit in the long run.
Those who embrace the prudential approach would contend 
that the significance of the analysis is limited to such 
instrumental considerations, and therein lies the difference 
between the prudential and the wealth maximization approaches.
The latter would go on to argue that if transactions costs 
were high, the court should mimic the market, and award the 
right initially to the firm whose product is more valuable, 
based on (estimated) market prices. (This conclusion holds, 
of course, regardless of whether the alternatives in question 
are medical services and candy, or medical services and,
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say, hallucinogenic drugs or acts of masochism.)
Some will consider the wealth-maximization approach more 
useful because it does generate conclusions, whereas the 
prudential approach only traces out the likely responses 
to given legal actions. But it is precisely the point, in the 
prudential view, that economic rationality ought to be limited 
to a study of the function of the law, and not consider its 
purpose.
It will be helpful in contrasting the "new" and prudential 
analyses to consider again Becker's analysis of crime.
As an analysis of criminal behavior in the choice-theoretic 
context, it is quite valuable. His specification of the 
supply function for offenses is solidly grounded in economic 
analysis of choice, as it assumes that a person chooses to 
commit an offense if the expected utility to him exceeds 
the utility he could get by using his time and other resources 
in alternative ways. Becker's deductions regarding the likely 
responses of "criminals" to various legal and other constraints 
are rigorous and imaginative. Certainly the analysis has 
tremendous instrumental value.
The significance of Becker's analysis stops there, however. 
His specification of the social loss function is interesting, 
but as he indicates himself, it- is useful only for the special 
case in which his underlying moral consensus prevails. Given 
all of his assumptions, Becker is able, of course, to apply 
the wealth maximization criterion and go beyond the purely 
instrumental role of the prudential analysis. He is able
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in his ovvn words,
. . . to answer normative questions,
namely how many resources and how much 
punishment should be used to enforce 
different kinds of legislation? Put 
equivalently, although more strangely, 
how many offenses should be permitted 
and how many offenders should be permitted 
to go unpunished? The method used formu­
lates a measure of the social loss from 
offenses and finds those expenditures2 
of resources that minimize this loss.
The prudential approach does not claim to be concerned
with these things. In order to see more concretely what
the prudential approach is all about, consider the trade
in illegal narcotics. There is much that economics can
contribute to the formulation and administration of drug
law, but it should be recognized that the economic rationality
has its limitations. A discussion of this issue will suggest
what those limitations are with regard to drug laws in
particular, and by implication, to legal theory and practice
in general.
The prudential analysis does not claim to be able 
to determine the optimal amount of drug traffic or use, 
or the amount of resources society ought to devote to the 
enforcement of drug laws. To understand the difficulties 
of such tasks, and the inadequacies of a purely economic 
approach to such normative questions, consider what it 
would mean to speak of "the amount of narcotics use that 
should be permitted." It is reasonable to assume that 
drug use causes a certain degree of external harm, just 
as factories cause smoke and strip mining destroys the
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beauty and vitality of the land. On the other hand, narcotics 
use presumably yields some sort of private gain or benefit 
to the user also. If the marginal harm always outweighed 
the marginal gain, the optimal amount of drug use would 
be zero. But if, as seem plausible, drug users initially 
cause low marginal costs which, however, increase as drug 
use grows (in terms of the indiviuals1 usage or the number 
of users) then it is likely that the optimal amount would 
be greater than zero.
Since the cost of enforcing drug laws must also be 
considered in a more complete analysis, the optimality 
condition would be that the marginal gain must equal the 
marginal harm plus the costs of enforcement. - In other words, 
the marginal gain must be sufficient to compensate society 
for any external harm plus the costs of apprehending and 
punishing the criminal .
This kind of reasoning is not objectionable, of course, 
but neither is it very useful in concrete situations. To 
say that the optimal amount of narcotics trade is that which 
equates costs and benefits at the margin, is to speak a 
truism which creates only the appearance of precise guidance.
Consider the difficulty of measuring the external costs.
There are some costs which can be measured relatively well 
in money or money equivalents: the salaries of policemen,
court officials and others involved in law enforcement, for 
instance. If drug use leads to shoplifting as a source of 
income for the user then the value of resources devoted to
preventing shoplifting would be relevant. It is not difficult
to imagine other costs which can be expressed relatively
well in monetary terms.
With narcotics use certain costs are imposed which are
not likely to find monetary expression however, and these
may in fact be more important as a matter of social concern.
Consider the following passages regarding drug addiction
in Harlem, from the acclaimed autobiography of Claude Brown,
Manchild in the Promised Land:
I remember that around 1952 and 1953, when cats 
first started getting strung out good, people
were saying "Damn, man, that cat went and robbed
his own family. He stole his father's suits, stole 
his mother's money . . In some cases the lack
of money had already killed most family life . . .
Cats were taking butcher knives and going at their 
fathers because they had to have money to get drugs. 
Anybody who was standing in the way of a drug 
addict when his habit was down on him--fr^m mother 
and father on down— was risking his life.
Anyone who would think seriously about the social costs 
of narcotics use must somehow take account of the costs, so
real in Brown's experience, which are not expressed as willing­
ness and ability to pay. Surely no one would suggest that 
the cost to the family be measured simply as the market 
value of the father's suit plus the stolen money.
The limitations of the wealth maximization approach 
are no less obvious with regard to the benefit, or gain, 
to the user. Here one might argue that the benefit can be 
measured relatively simply as the market or street price 
of narcotics. What users are willing and able to pay to 
obtain drugs would represent, in this view, the value of
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drugs.
Unfortunately, the implications of this approach are 
not necessarily in accord with experience and the dictates 
of good conscience. As users of heroin, for example, become 
more firmly entrenched in their habit, the amount they are 
willing to pay for the drug increases. This implies, according 
to the wealth maximization calculus, an increase in the optimal 
amount of heroin traded. But even if there were no external 
costs, one might sensibly argue that it would be wrong and 
unconscionable for society to sanction an increase in the 
use of heroin. Again, Brown's account deserves serious medita­
tion:
Around 1955 . . . nobody wanted to kick the habit
much. They were strung out, and they were really 
going down. There were ragged and beat-up. Cats 
who had never come out of the house without a pair 
of shoes on that didn't cost at least thirty-five 
dollars . . . were greasy and dirty . . . These were
people who had a whole lot of pride. They were 
people who had had too much pride to put a ^
dirty handkerchief in their pockets at one time. . .
The inadequacies of economic analysis as a normative basis
for drug laws are thus revealed when one carries the analysis
to its conclusions. The prudential attitude is that economics
ought to be limited to the purely instrumental role of describing
the choice behavior of the parties involved, and their responses
to different laws and methods of enforcement.
An excellent analysis of the illegal narcotics trade
has been offered in the spirit of the prudential law and
economics by Simon Rottenberg.^ A brief review of parts
of his study will illustrate the scope and significance
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though not the sophistication or rigor, of the prudential 
analysis.
Considering the supply side of the market, Rottenberg 
identifies the major cost ("unit of minimization" in his 
terminology) as the probability of being apprehended times 
the value of the punishment. Several factors affect the 
probability of getting caught. For instance, the extent 
of the market will determine the specialization of labor 
in the narcotics industry, and in turn, the length of the 
production chain from primary producer to final user. As 
the length of the chain grows, the probability that the primary 
producer will be caught diminishes because of the necessity 
for more persons to be "busted" before the source is reached. 
One implication, according to Rottenberg, is that a given 
expenditure to apprehend pushers will likely result in a 
larger number of busts, the smaller the market. A second 
implication is that information gathering ought to be targeted 
at the middle links of the chain rather than at the poles, 
since information gathered at the middle is likely to extend 
in two directions, providing helpful leads in getting at 
both producers and street dealers (retailers).
There may be certain technical economies in storing 
large quantities of drugs in a single place, but there is 
one important diseconomy: the more contraband found, the
greater the probability of conviction and the more severe 
the penalty. It might be good, therefore, to encourage 
storage. This could be accomplished by reducing the punishment
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for mere possession of drugs. This would, Rottenberg feels, 
induce illegal operators to hold larger inventories and, 
in turn, provide information to authorities about which 
persons to watch for other illegal activities, and ultimately 
raise the incidence of discovery and apprehension.
Regarding the demand side, Rottenberg focuses mostly 
on two issues: the price elasticity of demand for various
narcotics, and the tendency of users to "infect" others, 
thus bringing them into the market as buyers. If the demand 
for a particular drug, say, heroin, were highly inelastic, 
then a reduction in its supply would result in higher prices 
and greater expenditures by the user. Some of the significant 
social costs of heroin addiction are the result, directly 
or indirectly, of crimes such as muggings, shoplifting, 
burglaries, etc., committed by the user who must somehow 
support an enormously expensive habit. Price elasticity 
is determined by the availability of substitutes; thus, Rotten­
berg suggests that if the supply of relatively safe substitutes 
for heroin (e.g., methodone) were allowed to grow as the 
supply of heroin is restricted, the price of the latter would 
be held down. A second implication, (this really for the 
supply side) is that law enforcement which is directed only 
at "newcomers" would encourage the creation of monopoly 
suppliers whose prices would be predictably higher.
One widely held view is that drug addiction is analogous 
to a contagious disease in that the users tend to inflict 
their addiction upon nonusers. (This analogy became the
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subject of much debate during the 1965 mayoral race in New
York City.) Rottenberg offers some support for the analogy,
and calls attention to an interesting implication: Since
there appear to be returns to scale in the "infection" of
nonusers, i.e., the average "cost" of "infecting" persons
decreases with an increase in the number of addicts, then
law enforcement ought to concentrate on clusters of addicts.
Removing such clusters, or associations, would be more
effective than busting the isolated addict. Rottenberg's
analysis supports the suggestion made by one of the 1965
New York mayoral candidates that addicts ought to bo quarantined
just as other carriers of contagious diseases are quarantined.^
Robbenberg gets into other aspects of the narcotics trade
but it would serve no further purpose to review all of them
here. It should be apparent that his prudential analysis
could be useful in formulating and administering drug laws.
It does not pretend, however, to measure up to the larger
purposes suggested by economists who take the wealth-maximization
approach. Rottenberg sums up the significance of his analysis
in a way which suggests the importance of economic analysis,
yet carefully avoids pronouncements on the nature of harm
and injury, statements involving substantive rationality:
Maximizing individuals seeking euphoric 
utilities will prefer those instruments 
for securing it which are cheapest.
Can the substitutes for dangerous 
drugs (either in the form of drugs 
that are not dangerous or other 
commodities) be ranked? If so, 
policy can perhaps reduce their prices,
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relative to the prices of dangerous 
drugs. The authorities charged with 
the enforcement of the narcotics 
laws are faced with a set of alternative 
strategies among which they exercise 
options. This paper has touched upon 
some of the variables that affect 
optimizing bghavior by those 
authorities .
Concerning the narcotics trade, the prudential approach 
suggests that the policy conclusions of wealth maximization 
might be wrong as a matter of conscience and right judgement, 
i.e., as a matter of prudence. The prudential law and economics 
does not claim to offer a complete analysis of the narcotics 
trade, or any other area of legal concern. It insists upon 
a handmaiden role for economics, the final policy decisions 
being a matter of economic rationality and political and 
moral wisdom. Though public policy can and should be informed 
by economics, it must ulimately rely also upon prudential 
considerations.
Concluding Remarks: A Plea to the System Builders
The purpose of this dissertation has been to define 
the role of economics in a system of jurisprudence. The 
purpose has not been to advance any particular moral position; 
rather, it has been a major theme that economists ought 
to observe more carefully the boundary between positive 
and normative economics. Yet it ought not to seem paradoxical 
that this study should end with a call for the return to 
honest moral discourse in jurisprudence. While it has been 
argued at length that economics is a science devoid of
substantive rationality, it has also been suggested that 
jurisprudence is an a r t , with ethical and moral thought 
at its very heart.
Arthur Leff has described the modern intellectual world
9
as "normatively empty” . What has actually happened, it 
would seem, is that honest moral discourse has been replaced 
by ideological system building. Kantianism and utilitarianism 
are among the more impressive, at least the more popular, 
of such systems. Whether wealth maximization will take 
its place as an equal among them remains to be seen. To 
be sure, it is a full-grown system in Posner's view, complete 
unto itself and distinct from all the others. Moreover, 
he considers it a superior system since it contains, in 
his view, the other's own best elements. It is no paradox 
for Posner that to absolutize wealth is to serve a variety 
of moral and ethical goals. But if the critics of the "new" 
law and economics have been correctly interpreted above, 
then it would seem that Posner is wrong on both counts:
Wealth maximization is neither a theoretically complete 
system, nor one that serves, ultimately, any goal other 
than wealth.
The point, however, is to say that regardless of their 
relative success, Posner and other law economic .s of the 
"new" school are primarily and most essentially engaged 
in the business of system building. Like the Kantian and 
the utilitarian theorists with whom they quarrel, they are 
concerned mainly with the logic of the system, not the
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knowledge of good and evil.
The discussions above have brought to light some of 
the failings of the system-builing approach to juris­
prudence. They boil down to two: First, it seems that
nothing of real significance is accomplished in a debate 
among system builders. Honest discussion of the economic 
analysis of law has tended to degenerate into a trivial 
and pointless sort of logic-chopping. There is, however, 
a potentially significant consequence: as the various camps
continue to do battle, they are forced to build their pallisades 
ever higher. There is now a very real danger that the systems 
will become so tightly closed that communication among the 
theorists will become impossible, discussion being replaced 
by what amounts to alternately spoken monologues. Consider, 
for instance, the difficulty of communication today between 
sociologists and economists.
A second and more fundamental objection to system building 
is that all systems ultimately require the absolutization 
of some particular good: wealth for the economists; freedom,
utility, etc., for the others. Perhaps it is time to reconsider 
Socrates and the ancient philosphers who believed that when 
a single good is absolutized and pursued exclusively, in 
disregard to the harmonic ordering of all goods, then ideology 
has replaced wisdom.
The principle difference between ancient and modern 
ethical thought is that the ancients believed in the existence 
of an objective moral order, while most moderns do not.
Unlike the moderns, Socrates and the ancients took seriously
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the knowledge of good and evil.
Arthur Leff has suggested that the tendency to build
systems is hardly a mystery in light of modern ethical thought.
He tells us that long before the rise of law and economics
. . . the knowledge of good and evil, as an
intellectual subject, was being systematically 
and effectively destroyed. The historical fen 
through which ethical wanderings led was 
abolished in the early years of this century 
(not for the first time, but very clearly 
this time); normative thought crawled out of 
the swamp and died in the desert. There 
arose a great number of schools of ethics-- 
axiological, materialistic, evolutionary, 
intuitionist, situational, existentialist 
and so on -- but they all suffered the same 
fate: either they were seen to be ultimately
premised on some intuition (buttressed or not 
by nose-counts of those seemingly having the 
same intuitions), or they were even more 
arbitary than that, based s o l e l ^ o n  some "for 
the sake of argument" premises.
To speak objectively about the truth or falsity of 
values, as the ancients did, does not necessarily take one 
away from science and into the realms of religious revelation 
or superstition. There is an undeniable paradox in modern 
thought: A great many "moderns" are devoted to scientific
analysis and objective knowledge, yet steadfastly committed 
to the scientifically unfounded proposition that there 
is no possibility of objective knowledge in the realm of 
ethics and morality, i.e., that one can know nothing about 
the moral nature of mankind, and the institutions most 
conducive to happiness.
Serious moral and ethical thinking, the kind of thinking 
which engaged Socrates and the ancients, is the most difficult
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of all. Perhaps that is part of the reason why so many
economists, and non-economists too, have retreated from
it. What Professor Solow of MIT said about economists is
true of so many intellectuals today: "Economists are determined
lit'tle-thinkers," he wrote, adding that, "Little-thinking
can easily degenerate into mini-thinking or even into hardly
thinking at a l l . " ^
A number of intellectuals, both within and without 
the science of economics, have reached the point of hardly 
thinking at all ‘about jurisprudence. And many of those 
who still do think are engaged in the relatively less difficult 
kind of mini-thinking in which one constructs a tightly- 
closed system on one principle or another, resolving to 
accept any conclusion, however preposterous, in order to 
preserve the absolute sanctity of the principle chosen.
It is time to rise up to a higher level of discourse.
147
Notes to Chapter VI
^Richard Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (Boston:
Little, Brown and Co., 1977), p. 17.
2Gary Becker, "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach",
JPE 76 (1968), 169-70.
3Claude Brown, Manchild in the Promised Land (New York: 
McMillan Co., 1965), p. 181.
^Ibid., p . 185.
^Simon Rottenberg, "The Clandestine Distribution of 
Heroin, Its Discovery and Suppression", JPE (1968): 78-90.
g
See William F. Buckley, The Unmaking of a Mayor (New 
Rochelle: Arlington House, 1977), pp. 216-219,
7Ibid. , p. 217.
g '
Rottenberg, op . ci t . note 5, at 90.
^Arthur Leff, "Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism
Nominalism", Vja. _LR 60 (1974): 455.
^ I b i d  . , p . 454 .
'■'■R. M. Solo, "The New Industrial State or Son of Affluence", 
The Public Interest (1967): 100.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Baker, Edwin C. "The Ideology of the Economic Analysis 
of Law." Journal of Public Affairs 3 (1975).
Baker, Edwin C. "Utility and Rights: Two Justifications
for State Action Increasing Equality." Yale LJ 84 
( 1974): '40 - 48.
Bastiat, Frederic. Economic Harmonies. Irving-on-Hudson,
N. Y.: Foundation for Economic Education, 1968.
Bebchuk, Lucian. "The Pursuit of a Bigger Pie: Can Every­
one Expect a Bigger Slice?" Hofstra LR 8 (1980).
Becker, Gary S. An Economic Approach to Human Behavior. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976.
Becker, Gary S. Economic Theory. New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1971.
Becker, Gary S. and Landes, William M., ed. Essays in the
Economics of Crime and Punishment. New York and London: 
Columbia University Press, 1974.
Bloom, A. The Republic of Plato. New York: Basic Books,
Inc., 1968.
Brown, Calude. Manchild In the Promised Land. New York: 
McMillan Co., 1965.
Buckley, W. F. The Unmaking of a Mayor. New Rochelle: 
Arlington House, 1977.
Calabresi, Guido. "A Letter to Dworkin." Hofstra LR 8 
(Spring 1980).
Calabresi, Guido. "Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and 
the Law of Torts." ' Yale LJ 79 ( 1961).
Coase, Ronald. °The Problem of Social Cost." JLE 4 (October 
1960): 1 - 44.
Coleman, Jules. "Efficiency, Utility and Wealth Maximization 
Hofstra LR 8 (1980).
148
149
Dabb, Maurice. Welfare Economics and the Economics of Socialism. 
Cambridge Univ. Press., 1969.
Dworkin, Ronald. "Is Wealth a Value?" JL Stud. 9 (1980):
191 .
Dworkin, Ronald. "Why Efficiency?" Hofstra LR 1980.
Friedman, Milton. Price Theory. Chicago: Aldine Publishing
Co. 1976.
Hart, H. L. A. "American Jurisprudence Through English
Eyes: The Nightmare and the Noble Dream." G a . LR 11
(1977).
Hayek, F . A . The Counter Revolution of Science. Glencoe:
The Free Press, 1952.
Hayek, F. A. "The Trend in Economic Thinking." Economica 
(May 1933).
Jevons, W. S. The Principles of Economics. London: McMillan
& C o . , 1905.
Kirzner, Israel M. The Economic Point of View. New York:
D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1960.
Kornhauser, Lewis A. "A Guide to the Perplexed Claims of 
Efficiency in the Law." Hofstra LR 8 (1980).
Kronman, Anthony. "Wealth Maximization as a Normative Principle." 
JL Stud. 9 (1980): 227.
Leff, Arthur. "Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism 
About Normalism." V A . LR 60 (1974): 451.
Lerner, A. P. "Distributional Equality and Aggregate Utility: 
Reply." AER 78 (January 1970): 138 - 39.
McKenzie, R. and Tullock, G. The New World of Economics.
Homewood: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1975.
Mai thus, R. T. Principles of Political Economy. New York:
A. M. Kelly, 1964.
Markovits, R. S. "A Basic Structure for Micro-economic
Policy Analysis in Our Worse-Than-Second-Best World."
Wis. L R , 1975.
Menger, Carl. Principles of Economics. Glencoe: The Free 
Press, 1930.
150
Michelman, Frank. "Norms and Normativity in the Economic 
Theory of Law." M i n n . LR 62 (1978).
Mill, John Stuart. Principles of Political Economy. London: 
Togmans, Green and Co., Ltd. 1926.
Mises, Ludwig Van. Human Action. New Haven: Yale Univ.
Press, 1949.
Mishan, E. J. "A Survey of Welfare Economics, 1939-1959." 
Welfare Economics: Five Introductory Essays. New York:
Random House, 1969.
O'Driscoll, Gerald P. "Justice, Efficiency and The Economic 
Analysis of Law: A Comment on Fried." JL Stud. 9
(1980).
Perry, A. L. Elements of Political Economy. New York:
Scribner, Armstrong & Co., 1874.
Posner, R. A. Economic Analysis of La w . Boston: Little,
Brown, 1977 .
Posner, R. A. "Ethical and Political Basis of Efficiency 
Norm." Hofstra LR (1980).
Posner, R. A. "Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal 
Theory." JL Stud. VIII (Jan. 1979): 103-140.
Rizzo, Mario. "Law Amid- Flux: The Economics of Negligence
and Strict Liability Tort." JL Stud. 9 (1980).
Robbins, L. An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic 
Science. London: MacMillan & Co., 1945.
Rottenberg, Simon. "The Clandestine Distribution of Heroin,
Its Discovery and Suppression." JPE (1968): 78 - 90.
Rubin, Paul. "Predictability and the Economic Approach 
to Law: A Comment on Rizzo." JL Stud. 9 (1980).
Samuels, W. J. The Chicago School of Political Economy.
East Lansing: Association of Evolutionary Economics
and Division of Research, Michigan State University,
1976.
Samuels, W. and Schmid, Al. Law and Economics: An Institu­
tional Approach. Hingman: Martinus Nijoff, 1981.
Say, J. B. A Treatise o-n Political Economy. New York: 
A. M. Kelly, 1964.
151
Schumpter, J. A. History of Economic Analysis. New York: 
Oxford Univ. Press, 1954.
Seligman, E.R.A. "Social Elements in the Theory of Value." 
OLE (May 1901) .
Smith, Adam. An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the
Wealth of Nations. New York: The MOdern Library, 1937.
Smith, Adam. The Theory of Moral Sentiment. London: Cadell
and Davies, 1812.
Solow, R. M. "The New Industrial State or Son of Affluence."
The Public Interest (1967).
Spadaro, Louis M. New Directions in Austrian Economics. 
Kansas City: Sheed Andrews and McNeel, Inc., 1978.
Vaughn, Karen I. "Does It Matter That Costs Are Subjective?" 
Southern Economic Journal (Jan. 1980).
Wickstead, P. H. The Common Sense of Political Economy. 
London: George Rutledge & Sons, Ltd., 1935.
VITA
Will Carrington Heath 
1261 Greensboro Road 
Birmingham, Alabama 35208
PERSONAL DATA:
Born: May 26, 1953, Chattanooga, Tennessee
Married to the former Lisa L. Lalande of Lafayette, Louisiana. 
EDUCATION:
Graduated from Scottsbo.ro High School in 1971.
Earned B. S. degree from Auburn University, 1975.
Earned M. S. degree from Auburn University, 1979.
EMPLOYMENT
Assistant Professor of Economics, Birmingham Southern
College, Birmingham, AL, September, 1982 - present.
152
EXAMINATION AND THESIS REPORT
Candidate: W ill C arrington  Heath
Major Field: Economics
Title of Thesis: The M eth o d o lo g ica l F oundations o f  Law and Order
Approved:
Lu'JLU» »  t . <r;
Major Professor and Onairman
a te / SchoolDean of the Gradu te!
EXAMINING COMMITTEE:
f-v t / ---
U3 ..
7  > U ^  ^
Date of Examination:
